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THE SOVIET STYLE OF SURPRISE

by

Wayne James Rowe

June 1985

Thesis Advisor:

K.L. Herbig

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This thesis ends by making several recommendations on how the effects of a surprise attack may be reduced if not eliminated.

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The Soviet Style of Surprise

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the nature and scope of surprise and its uses in modern warfare using historical data, computer-aided analysis, and three case studies (Manchuria, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan).

From the data analysis, this thesis develops a Soviet "style" of surprise.

Additionally, the analysis indicates that with a relatively small number of deceptive ruses the probability of a successful surprise attack is very high even if the ruses are detected and a warning is sounded.

This thesis ends by making several recommendations on how the effects of a surprise attack may be reduced if not eliminated.

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I. INTRODUCTION

"It is pardonable to be defeated.

But never to be surprised."

Frederick the Great

A. THESIS OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE

The objective of this paper is to determine how and to what degree the Soviet Union uses the element of surprise in their conduct of war and aggression. This paper will additionally attempt to show, using both historical data and case studies, that the Soviets have a "style" of fighting that relies on the use of surprise and this "style" differs dramatically from any other country.

There are several Soviet and American writings on surprise attacks with nuclear weapons. It is the opinion of many high officials, both political and military, (and one this author subscribes to) that small-level conflicts of a non-nuclear nature are more likely to occur than a surprise first strike nuclear attack. The Soviet Union makes their risk assessments based on what they call "the Correlation of Forces." This concept takes into account many factors but the four primary dimensions are political, economic, military and moral. These dimensions are categorized and calculated for both the Soviets and their prospective opponent. If the Soviets are

sufficiently ahead in most areas then they feel confident that they can achieve success. If their advantage is small or if they are behind they are inclined to wait until this correlation changes into their favor. The use of nuclear weapons interjects more uncertainty into the Soviet equation than they like and decreases their chances of victory. The present-day strategy of the Soviet Union appears to be to accumulate such overwhelming numbers of nuclear weapons, relative to the United States' nuclear arsenal, that these weapons would be neutralized and their first strike use extremely remote. In other words, nuclear weapons make it safer to conduct conventional warfare. Even if nuclear weapons were to be used, most scenarios have these weapons being used only after a conventional attack had already initiated the conflict. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper all battles or wars are assumed to be conducted with conventional ammunition and do not involve nuclear weapons.

This paper is divided into four parts: Introduction, Historical Data Base and Analysis, Case Studies and Conclusion. Part I begins by explaining some Soviet terms and answering a few basic questions on what is meant by the word "surprise". In this section the three dimensions of Soviet surprise and how they are achieved in war are introduced.

In Part II, four major areas are discussed. First, why history is important and why its lessons must be remembered

is considered. Second, the elements of surprise, deception, warning and preconception are examined to see how they relate and contribute to victory in warfare. This investigation is aided by empirical evidence obtained from Barton Whaley's historical data base. Thirdly, the countries of United Kingdom, Germany, Soviet Union and United States are examined as to their preferences and utilization of the above elements and other key variables, from the data base, in an effort to establish a "style" of warfare and more specifically a "style" in the use of surprise. There is a tendency to explain the actions and behavior of the Soviets as if one were actually looking at oneself in a mirror. This practice is far too common and extremely dangerous. The idea that the Soviets "are just like we are" is a mistake and a misinterpretation of the Soviet "style". This misperception is challenged in this section. It must be remembered that the main aim of this paper is to obtain the above styles in the case of the Soviet Union; the other countries are only mentioned in an effort to show similarities or differences as they relate to the Soviets. This part ends by looking at the several reasons why the Soviets have selected the Manchurian campaign as the Soviet "model" in the use of surprise and offensive operations.

As a study of Soviet style of surprise in Part III this paper looks at three cases where the Soviets used surprise as part of their political/military plans in order to achieve

their objectives. The three cases are the Soviet invasions of Manchuria in 1945, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979. It is in this section that the five elements of Soviet surprise, intention, time, place, strength, and style are examined to see what lessons can be learned from them.

Part IV stresses the importance that the Soviet Union places on the use of surprise. Additionally, there are several recommendations about surprise avoidance and how a potential victim can eliminate or at least reduce surprise and its effects. It is in this section that the author cautions the Western world, especially the U.S., to be ever mindful that this potential adversary (the Soviet Union) has used surprise very successfully in the past and continues to write of its vast importance in modern warfare today. It is in our national interest to remember this fact. For it is in doing so that we take our first step in the prevention of becoming a victim of it.

B. WHAT IS SURPRISE?

"Surprise is the harbinger of victory."

Marshal Zakharov

What is surprise? How important is it? How does one achieve it? These three questions have been asked for hundreds of years and have been answered in a variety of ways by many different military strategists.

What is surprise? Richard K. Betts in his book Surprise Attack, states; "Surprise is defined in terms of the defender's unreadiness caused by one or more mistaken estimates of whether, when, where, and how the enemy would strike." [Ref. 1] In the Soviet Military Encyclopedia the Soviets said this about surprise: Actions unexpected by the enemy which enhance the achievement of success in combat, in an operation, and in war. Surprise is one of the major principles of military art and consists of choosing the time, procedures, and modes of combat operations which make it possible to strike when the enemy is least prepared to ward off a strike." [Ref. 2]

On the surface, surprise in warfare appears to be easily understood and its importance self-evident. Therein lies a trap, a difficulty to overcome, for surprise is a behavior which only comes to be known, and perhaps understood almost exclusively after it has happened.

How important is surprise? Carl Von Clausewitz in his book On War writes: "Surprise lies more or less at the foundation of all undertakings, for without it superiority at the decisive point is really not conceivable." [Ref. 3] Clausewitz goes on to say: "Surprise is not only the means to the attainment of numerical superiority; but it is also to be regarded as a substantive principle in itself." [Ref. 4]

In 350 B.C. Sun Tzu listed what he considered major and relevant factors of war. Since that time all major military theoreticians have established their own subjective lists. These lists of "substantive principles" have become known as "The Principles of War." Each author of these principles chooses factors that they consider important. Normally these lists are arranged so that those factors of highest importance appear first on the list. In Barton Whaley's unpublished book Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War, there is a table where he summarizes twenty-four "Principles of War" lists. He starts with Sun Tzu and works his way up to the present. It is interesting to note that nineteen, nearly 80%, of these authors list surprise as one of the important factors in war. [Ref. 5]

From the above definitions of surprise and the numerous appearances of surprise in the "Principles of War" lists, it would seem that the importance of surprise is known implicitly. However, it does not fully answer the question of how important is surprise? To get a better measure of the significance of surprise this author looked at two studies that gathered empirical data on numerous battles and wars. These studies were conducted in an effort to establish relationships between the many elements that make up warfare and to see how they lead to success in combat.

The first study was done by Barton Whaley. The data encompasses 226 conflict situations (case studies) between the

years 1914 to 1973. Using this data, it can be shown that in 78% of the cases the element of surprise was used successfully. Additionally, when deception was used to augment a surprise attack, a surprise attack was successfully achieved 94% of the time. Further evaluation of surprise, based on this data base, is done in Part II of this paper.

The second study was done by Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO). The major output of the HERO study was the development of the Quantified Judgment Method of Analysis of Historical Combat Data (QJMA). This retrospective model was able to predict victory in eighty-one division and corp sized engagements of World War II 92% of the time. This same model, when applied to the same engagements but modified to predict the winners on the basis of Firepower and Numbers alone (leaving out the calculations for surprise), only had a 67% prediction rate.

As is briefly described above, surprise can be accomplished and it plays an important role in war. But how does one achieve it? The concept sounds easy enough, yet all of Part III of this paper goes into great detail on how the Soviets achieved surprise during the three campaigns studied. As a summary of how surprise is achieved the following two statements may be compared. First, a Western view: "Surprise is achieved when a sudden military action by one antagonist has not been predicted, much less anticipated, by its intended victim." [Ref. 6] Secondly, a Soviet view from one of the

many articles written by Soviet military experts on the concept of how to achieve surprise in war:

"Surprise is achieved by confusing the enemy of one's intentions, by keeping secret the overall purpose of the forthcoming action and its preparation; by rapid and concealed concentration and deployment of forces in the region of making the strike, by the unexpected use of weapons, as well as by the use of tactical procedures and new weapons unknown to the enemy. In other words surprise is achieved by making strikes against the enemy at a place and a time where he does not expect them."
[Ref. 7]

Any discussion of the Soviet military would be incomplete if it did not include a brief explanation of what the Soviets call "military art". To the Soviets, military art is the application of scientific laws and principles to warfare. Military art is broken down into three levels; strategy, operational art, and tactics. Surprise as part of the military art is treated in the same way. The Soviets apply what they see as their scientific method and terminology to the concept and define it on the same three levels. Strategic surprise is that dimension of surprise that is accomplished on a large scale. Strategic surprise includes both political and military forms of deception to aid and increase the achievement of surprise. On the political side items such as diplomatic deception of a country's intentions are normally essential if one is to have strategic surprise. In a military context, strategic surprise is carried out by appearing to support that which is done by the political leaders while keeping controlled and secret the movement of large amounts of troops, normally associated with a war or

campaign. Operational surprise is a degree lower than strategic surprise and involves the achievement of surprise by individual theaters of military operations. Operational surprise takes into account items such as "misdirecting the opponent's calculation of the time, strength, direction, speed and manner of possible attack." [Ref. 8] Tactical surprise is surprise achieved by operational units and formulations. It normally encompasses the unexpected use of weapons, or techniques not seen by one's adversary before. Soviet Marshal Matzulenko describes surprise within this framework as follows:

"Surprise is the product of a victim's ignorance, preconceptions, and gullibility as well as the attacker's ability to deceive. In Soviet military doctrine, the attacker's success in concealing his intent and timing yields STRATEGIC SURPRISE; misdirecting the opponent's calculations of the time, strength, direction, speed and manner of possible attacks, generates OPERATIONAL SURPRISE; and TACTICAL SURPRISE derives from the unexpected weapons, techniques and skills that are actually employed in combat." [Ref. 9]

II. HISTORICAL DATA BASE AND ANALYSIS: LOCKING FOR A STYLE

A. WHY USE HISTORY?

Why use history to look toward the future? Why use historical data to explain or predict events in the future? At first glance it does not seem logical to look backward if one wants to see forward. Certainly everyone would agree that it would be dangerous and ludicrous to drive a car on the New York Expressway while one was facing backward. However, in the realm of world politics where the rules of behavior are not as clearly defined as driving a car, history, the looking backwards, can play an important role. If one ignores the past then one forfeits the opportunity to learn from experience. It is a fact that each generation has its own radical leaders and crises to content with and surely history does not repeat itself exactly. Neither does history provide detailed guidance for daily operations to answer political or military problems. However, what history can do is to reveal and recommend ways and means to achieve invaluable gains and advantages or avoid huge pitfalls. The major reason that history should be used is its impact on all things be they political, technological or agricultural, but especially on the military area. Concepts may change, systems may change, but the principle element does not change and always will be the same, Man! The nature of change is that it

is very often slow, and only occurs in minor details. It is only when man adapts new technology and applies it does warfare or any other area of study advance. Man should be more sensitive to his important role. One way to do this is to remember the past. Man, in order to move productively ahead, must use the lessons that can be drawn from what prior mankind has tried and experienced.

Two Frenchmen in the 1830's set out on a journey. Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States. Marquis de Custine visited Russia. These two Frenchmen kept journals of their trips and when they returned to France each wrote a book. Their works are examples of how mankind through the ages changes very little. The systems of government may change, grow in size and vary in style. The people, those who make that history, change little. In the introduction to Journey For Our Time, General Walter B. Smith who spent several years as American Ambassador in Moscow talks about the parallels between Custine's Russia and that of the present day Soviet Union. "I could have taken many pages verbatim from his journal and after substituting present day names and dates for those of a century ago, have sent them to the State Department as my own official reports. Washington would have found them in complete harmony with what I had had to say about my experiences and observations." [Ref. 10] General Smith goes on to say that "... the analogy between Russia of 1839 and the Soviet Union today is so striking that one must

pinch himself to recall that Custine was writing more than a hundred years ago." [Ref. 11]

The main topic of this paper is the use of surprise in warfare. Surprise is successful because of many factors but central to the accomplishment of surprise is the perceptions of the intended victim. For the United States it is troublesome to note that three major items that can contribute to becoming a victim of a surprise attack are items that the United States has exhibited on occasion. These items are: (1) Not learning from past experiences. (2) The difficulty to revise or reverse their concepts of a possible enemy even when the evidence is available. (3) Democratic systems produce entangled alliances which are constraining by their nature to respond timely and with the necessary resolve to prevent a surprise attack and minimize its effects.

The Soviet political leaders are of a different mind set and style than most of the West. The Soviets actively use their history and specifically their history of warfare. They use their history to train and test ideas that have proven successful under battlefield conditions.

The following is an example of how modern Soviet beliefs on warfare and specifically the use of surprise have been influenced by historical events and how these events have shaped and developed Soviet doctrine and strategy.

The Second World War has been over for forty years and the Soviets still see it as a laboratory where lessons on

warfare still can be learned. A brutal lesson the Soviets were forced to learn was taught to them by the great loss of Soviet blood and land. The modern use of surprise was thrust upon them when the Germans invaded on June 22, 1941. The extremely poor showing of the Soviet troops was brought on by the misperceptions of their leaders, especially Stalin. To downplay this overwhelming surprise attack Stalin lowered the importance of the element of surprise by removing it from the Soviet's principles of war list, which Stalin called the permanently operating factors, and assigned it to a newly created list called transitory operating factors of which surprise was the only member. Bitter lessons such as this are not easily forgotten and the Soviets are determined to never allow themselves to be surprised on such a large scale again. This lesson from history would not be repeated. The Soviets soon learned how effective surprise could be and mastered its use and applied it successfully several times before the war ended. After the war, because of Stalin's over-sensitivity to being surprised by the Germans in 1941, for all practical purposes surprise was removed from all written and spoken Soviet military thought during his lifetime. It was not until 1955, two years after Stalin's death, that World War II Soviet Tank Marshal Rotmistrov was able to revive the issue of surprise in warfare when he wrote his watershed article "On the Role of Surprise in Contemporary War". The following quotes from that article

summarize the importance Marshal Rotmistrov places on history and the element of surprise in war;

"The experience of history has shown that the skillful employment of surprise brings true success, not only in battles and operations, but also in war. If a war starts with a surprise attack, then as a rule it [surprise attack] essentially determines the strategic victory in the first stage of the war and secures the conditions for the advantageous development of subsequent military activities." [Ref. 12]

He goes on to say;

"Thus on the basis of the experience of past wars it is possible to assert that surprise, successfully accomplished, not only influences the course of battles and operations but in certain circumstances can influence to a significant extent the course and even the outcome of the whole war." [Ref. 13]

This theme of surprise is repeated and emphasized in more recent Soviet writings on military doctrine and operations.

From the Soviet point of view the most glorious and successful example of the use of surprise was the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in 1945 at the end of World War II. This success story is repeatedly cited in Soviet military literature whenever surprise, deception or camouflage are discussed. The Manchurian campaign as a Soviet surprise model will be covered later in this paper.

History is a looking glass toward the future. It is not an absolute nor is it a fortune teller's crystal ball full of answers and details. However, it is a tool that needs to be mastered and used to achieve its fullest potential. Historical data should aid political and military leaders to make wiser decisions today. Behavioral trends of the past

should influence decision on the strategy to combat present day crisis. The people of the United States often exhibit a "McDonald's" mind set opting for the quick fix or hurry up solution rather than drawing upon the lessons of history. This is a problem our rival and prospective adversary does not have, for he conscientiously does not allow it to happen.

In 1969 Hugh Trevor-Roper, a famous Oxford historian, was addressing an audience on the importance and relevance of history. He summed up the subject by saying:

"We cannot profitably look foward without also looking back." [Ref. 14]

B. THE DATA BASE

This section is based on a computerized data base of 226 battle/conflict case studies that occurred in 20 wars from 1914 to 1973. This data is taken in part from Barton Whaley's 1969 unpublished manuscript Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War. Additional information came from a computer tape obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) containing data which adds to and corrects Whaley's data and updates it to 1973.

The data is arranged into cases and the cases are grouped into three categories labeled A, B, and C. Category A is made up of cases where strategic surprise and/or strategic deception was used (93 cases). Category B contains cases where tactical surprise and/or tactical deception was used (78 cases). Category C are cases where neither surprise nor deception were used (59 cases).

To understand Whaley's data it would be helpful to define the terms he used. Therefore for the purposes of this section the following definitions will apply:

- SURPRISE:** Surprise is achieved when a sudden military action by one antagonist has not been predicted, much less anticipated, by its intended victim. (Note: this is seen from the victim's point of view and as an effect.)
- DECEPTION:** Deception is an act intended by its perpetrator to dupe or mislead a victim. (Note: this is seen from the user's point of view and an active measure he undertakes)
- STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL:** Strategic surprise or deception is distinguished from tactical cases by the degree to which the military action affects the victim's mobilization, deployment, or grand strategy. In general, at the tactical level surprise and deception evolves into strategies where the locus of command shifts from the narrow zone of battle with the field commanders, to the point where it involves larger areas and senior military or political leaders are in more positive and direct control.

Before looking at the results obtained from the data analysis it is important to note that the structure of the data base is statistically suspect. This is due in part to the selection process of the cases. Category A cases are claimed to be an all-inclusive set and thereby obviates the need to develop a viable sample. Additionally, categories B and C fail to meet the fundamental requirement of randomness. The author is well aware of these problems and for the analysis done in this paper (frequencies, percentages, tabulations, etc.) these problems are not applicable. For analysis such as factor analysis and regression analysis, the results which are obtained are not used as precise equations which produce

final answers, but as a starting point to focus on in order to view and develop a better understanding of which variables contribute to the "style of surprise" of various countries and particularly of the Soviet Union.

To ensure the validity of the results obtained, only four countries were used: Britain, Germany, Russia and the United States. These countries were chosen because each had data available to make the results significant. The total data for the remaining countries, as a group, was large but for individual countries were statistically not significant. These four countries together make up 67.7% of the entire data base. (British - 47 cases, German - 47 cases, Russian - 22 cases, U.S. - 37 cases) It is interesting to note that one can immediately get a feeling of how important surprise and deception are to these world powers by the following simple comparison. These four countries make up 67.7% of the data base. Therefore, it would be logical to presume that these four countries would make up approximately 67.7% of each of the three case categories. This is true in A cases (Strategic Surprise and Deception - 68.5%). However, this is not the case in categories B and C. In B cases (Tactical Surprise and Deception) these countries are high with 78.2% and in C cases (No Surprise or Deception) they are low with 49.1%. What this appears to show is that these four countries favor the use of surprise and deception. A second way to stress this point is to compare these four countries among

themselves and with the remaining countries as to their use of surprise and deception. When this is done the following conclusions are obtained. Where the four countries' cases breakdown to 41% of A cases, 40% of B cases and 19% of C cases, the remaining countries (9 in all) breakdown as 41% of A cases, 19% of B cases and 40% of C cases. Simply, the "Big Four" cases used surprise and deception 81% of the time where the other countries only used it 60% of the time. From this simple analysis one can see that these four countries must view surprise as a significant asset, for what other reason would they have for choosing to use it so many times.

C. FOUR MAJOR ELEMENTS

The effects of a surprise attack or the use of surprise in warfare is a very difficult element to anticipate definitively. Surprise for many people is a concept best understood only after it has happened and they are victims of its effects. It is therefore the purpose of this section to examine surprise, using the data described above, and see what effects it does have on warfare as an influence on the outcome of an engagement, battle or war. Additionally, this section looks at the elements of deception, warning and preconception and how they influence both the achievement of surprise and the attainment of victory. Finally, this section investigates whether the choice of day or time of day an attack begins increases one's likelihood of achieving surprise or victory.

The structure of this section is to first address the issues raised above in a general manner, and then specifically, by looking at how the countries of Great Britain, Germany, Soviet Union, and United States responded to the same issues. For convenience, the four countries will be referred to in the remainder of this paper as the "Big Four".

In Table 1, the four factors, surprise, deception, warning and preconception are summarized in three categories. The first category lists the number of occasions that these factors were used or attempted and the associated percentage of use to total cases (Note: there were 205 case studies looked at). The second category lists the percentage of times that a factor was used and in that case surprise was achieved. The third category lists the number of times that a factor was used and the case ended in victory for the initiator. Additionally, the victory to usage percentage is calculated.

In Table 1, of the four factors described, the element of surprise has the highest percentages of being used (77.6%). It appears from the data that the use of surprise favorably increased the probability of victory. In fact when surprise was used it resulted in victory 91.8 percent of the time. When no surprise was used defeat occurred 63 percent of the time.

Although the element of deception was not used as often as the element of surprise it was used a high percentage of

TABLE 1

SURPRISE, DECEPTION, WARNING & PRECONCEPTION SUMMARY

	FACTOR	ATTEMPTED OR USED	NOTE *(1) %	SURPRISE ACHIEVED %	VICTORY ACHIEVED	NOTE *(2) %
1	SURPRISE	159	77.6	100	146	91.8
	NO SURPRISE	46	22.4	0	17	37.0
2	DECEPTION	139	67.8	93.5	125	89.9
	NO DECEPTION	66	32.2	11.8	38	57.6
3	WARNING	157	76.6	93.2	116	73.9
	NO WARNING	48	23.4	95.0	47	97.9
4	PRECONCEPTION	119	58.0	96.6	114	95.8
	NO PRECONCEPTION	86	42.0	40.4	49	57.0

Notes: 1. Total Cases = 205
 2. % as a function of attempted/used.

the time and was associated with victorious outcomes an impressive 89.9 percent of the time. Additionally, in cases where deception was used it increased the likelihood of surprise being achieved to almost 94%. (A linkage between surprise and deception will be looked at later.) An interesting result that should not go unnoticed is the fact that there were several cases where neither surprise nor deception was used and yet a victory was achieved. However, it must also be pointed out that with further investigation this can be accounted for in most cases by the fact that the initiating country had an overwhelming strength ratio to its advantage.

Warning is a peculiar element with some rather interesting results. First, when an aggressive nation was able to achieve the difficult task of conducting a surprise attack without giving prior warning to its intended victim, the outcome resulted in almost a sure victory (97.9%). Fortunately for the world these occurrences are rare and were only accomplished in less than a quarter of the cases. One would believe that if an intended victim has received threatening warning signals from another nation that the likelihood of achieving a surprise attack from that country would be low and at least sufficient to prevent defeat. However, based on the tabulated results and supported by the case studies, this is incorrect. In fact even though an intended victim has received some degree of warning the initiating aggressor still was able to achieve surprise, for in over three quarters

of the cases where some warning was present surprise was achieved (93.2%), and victory was accomplished 73.9 percent of the time. Possible reasons for this result will be examined later.

The utilization of the element of preconception is one that either reinforces or confuses those commonly held beliefs of a victim country in an effort to enhance the achievement of surprise and victory. This element is very difficult to accomplish for it takes extremely professional governmental agencies using a normally lengthy and detailed process of manipulation. However, if one can skillfully exploit this element the likelihood of achieving surprise (96.6%) and victory (95.8%) are well worth the time and effort.

Table 2 breaks down the information in Table 1 by countries and each of these categories is further divided into the outcome achieved, both victories and defeats. The complexity of Table 2 hinders many of the unique results from becoming readily apparent. Therefore, to bring out these results, the data was compiled and summarized and Table 3 was constructed. Under the category of surprise and the column for uses, all four countries are above the data base norm, with the Soviet Union significantly higher. However, under victories achieved by surprise, the Soviets and United Kingdom are slightly below the average and the Germans slightly above.

TABLE 2
SURPRISE, DECEPTION, WARNING & PRECONCEPTION SUMMARY BY COUNTRIES

		UK				CERN				SOV				US			
		VICTORY		DEFEAT		VICTORY		DEFEAT		VICTORY		DEFEAT		VICTORY		DEFEAT	
		Z	#	Z	#	Z	#	Z	#	Z	#	Z	#	Z	#	Z	#
S	YES	33	70.2	4	8.5	34	79.1	2	4.7	17	81.0	2	9.5	23	76.7	2	6.7
U																	
R																	
P																	
R																	
I																	
S	NO	4	8.5	6	12.8	2	4.7	5	11.6	0	0	2	9.5	3	10.0	2	6.7
E																	
D																	
E																	
C	YES	30	63.8	4	8.5	28	65.1	3	7.0	14	66.7	1	4.8	22	73.3	2	6.7
E																	
P																	
T																	
I																	
O	NO	7	14.9	6	12.8	8	18.6	4	9.3	3	14.3	3	14.3	4	13.3	2	6.7
M																	
U																	
A	YES	18	38.3	9	19.1	32	74.4	7	16.3	14	66.7	4	19.0	15	50.0	4	13.3
R																	
M																	
I																	
M	NO	19	40.4	1	2.1	4	9.3	0	0	3	14.3	0	0	11	36.7	0	0
C																	
P																	
R-C																	
E-O																	
M																	
C	YES	24	72.7	0	0	21	70.0	1	3.3	15	83.3	1	5.6	22	84.6	1	3.8
E																	
P																	
T																	
O																	
M	NO	6	18.2	3	9.1	6	20.0	2	6.7	2	11.1	0	0	2	7.7	1	3.8

TABLE 3

SURPRISE, DECEPTION, WARNING & PRECONCEPTION;

	COUNTRY	USED %	VICTORY %
SURPRISE	ALL	77.6	91.8
	UK	78.7	89.2
	GERM	83.7	94.4
	SOV	90.5	89.5
	US	83.3	92.0
DECEPTION	ALL	67.8	89.9
	UK	72.3	88.2
	GERM	72.1	90.3
	SOV	71.5	93.3
	US	80.0	91.7
WARNING	ALL	76.6	73.9
	UK	57.4	66.7
	GERM	90.7	82.1
	SOV	85.7	77.8
	US	63.3	78.9
NO WARNING	ALL	23.4	97.9
	UK	42.5	95
	GERM	9.3	100
	SOV	14.3	100
	US	36.7	100
PRE- CONCEPTION	ALL	58.0	95.8
	UK	51.1	100
	GERM	51.1	95.5
	SOV	76.2	93.8
	US	76.6	95.7

Under deception all of the "Big Four" use it more than the norm with the United States significantly higher. An interesting result shown in the table is that even though the Soviets used deception the least it obtained the most from it and had a higher victory rate than the other three countries.

On the element of Warning and how it affects the outcome of a conflict the four countries are paired and diametrically opposed. The United Kingdom and the United States are lower than the norm and significantly less than Germany and the Soviets. This implies that the United Kingdom and the United States are significantly better at preventing their enemies from knowing their intentions prior to an attack. This seems odd when the other two countries are more secretive type governments and one would expect them to be better at hiding their intentions. But in fairness to the United Kingdom and the United States, their intelligence services may just have been all that much better, especially in view of the breaking of the cipher codes Ultra by the British and Magic by the United States. However, in spite of what appears to be a significant advantage to the United Kingdom and the United States, the outcome based on this category is not drastically different. It would appear that neither the United Kingdom nor the United States was able to capitalize on this advantage and it may have even hindered the United Kingdom.

Preconception, like warning, exhibits a sharp contrast among the data for each country. The United Kingdom and Germany are slightly below the norm while the Soviet Union and the United States are significantly higher in the utilization of a victim's preconceptions. All four are normative in their victory rate when preconceptions are used which is an extremely high average. Preconception may be a factor to be exploited if a country wants to be victorious or a factor to be understood and prevented if one does not want to be defeated.

D. MORE ABOUT SURPRISE

Surprise in warfare is a multifaceted and multi-dimensional element. It can be examined from many different angles and perspectives. One can investigate the use of surprise from the point of view of the country initiating it or from the opposite view of the country who is attempting to prevent it. One can look at what causes or aids the attainment of surprise, as was done using the results from Tables 1, 2 and 3. Additionally, one can observe either the effects upon the victims or the advantages to the initiator when a surprise attack is successful.

There are but a few examples of the many ways one can approach the difficult question of how to explain what surprise is and what are its effects on warfare. The aim of this section is to reduce the enormous amount of information by focusing on the major factors of surprise and

their effects in order to better understand surprise. One need not count all the stars in the sky to navigate across the vast oceans. However, one needs to know where to look in order to find the key stars for a safe journey. Likewise, one need not know everything about surprise.

Some guidelines, some general concepts about surprise could aid the political or military decision makers who might contemplate using a surprise strategy or who are facing a challenge from an adversary who favors the use of surprise and must find a possible counter.

This paper does not suppose that what is presented here would be correct for all cases and all times. However, what is hoped is that some of these points would be considered.

1. The Five Elements of Surprise

There are many ways to categorize and classify the different forms and versions of surprise. Some authors label them "factors", some "components", still others "dimensions". Some authors look at surprise through the eyes of the surpriser while others are concerned with the victim's point of view.

The one that this author found to be both concise and convenient was the categorization used by Barton Whaley in his book Stratagem. It consists of five elements which are summarized below.

- (1) INTENTION: The fundamental preferences and choices that determine whether a given war, campaign, or battle changes from possibility to reality. Intention is a precondition of the other varieties of surprise. Additionally, could be considered the rationale or why the attack must occur.
- (2) TIME: Unexpectedness of time. Not knowing when the attack will come.
- (3) PLACE: Refers to the point or area threatened, or to the direction or axis of operation. The target or where the attack will occur.
- (4) STRENGTH: Refers to the amount of military force committed to the operation.
- (5) STYLE: The form that the military operation takes, the fashion in which it is carried out. How the campaign is accomplished, normally viewed by looking at and comparing military doctrines.

No categorized listing is ever 100% clear and precise, but the above list is simple and very easy to work with. Its one drawback is that there are instances where one element begins to overlap with another. There are examples where one item could as easily be included in one element or another. This problem was reduced here providing a large number of examples to support any particular surprise element. Therefore, when there was an item in question no harm was done by the choice of where it was grouped.

From Table 4, it can be seen that the surprise factor PLACE is the most often used. Surprise with regard to TIME and STRENGTH are next but a good distance behind.

TABLE 4

UTILIZATION OF THE FACTORS OF SURPRISE BY CASE TYPE

FACTOR OF SURPRISE	ALL CASES	STRATEGIC CASES	TACTICAL CASES
INTENT	40	46	16
TIME	61	73	56
PLACE	73	75	69
STRENGTH	56	60	53
STYLE	31	25	33

Note: All numbers are percentages.

The two factors that appear to be the hardest to accomplish and therefore the least utilized are the surprise factors of INTENT and STYLE. As the table shows, this trend holds for both strategic and tactical cases, with the only exceptions being the factor of INTENT which appears to be accomplished more at the strategic level than at the tactical. Additionally, the factor of STYLE was slightly easier to accomplish at the tactical level vice the strategic.

What factor of surprise was used the most is important but one needs to know when these factors are used and what are their outcomes in conflict. Table 5, covers part of this question and shows how the "Big Four" fare in relation to the use of these factors and the percentage of the time their use contributed to a victorious outcome. The overall average any factor is victorious for any country is about 43% of the time. From this generalization it can be seen that the factors of TIME, PLACE and STRENGTH exceeded this average for almost all countries. For STYLE they are all well below average while for INTENT German and Soviet are at the average while the United Kingdom and the United States are well below.

The United States data points to two unique observations. One, the factor PLACE for the United States is significantly high and has given victorious results 73.3%. Secondly, it appears that the United States was not very successful in obtaining victories when using the surprise factor of INTENT for its score for this factor is the lowest in the table.

TABLE 5

VICTORIOUS USE OF THE FACTORS OF SURPRISE BY COUNTRY

FACTOR OF SURPRISE	UK	GERM	SOV	US
INTENT	23.4	44.2	42.9	16.7
TIME	42.5	58.1	57.1	53.3
PLACE	59.6	44.2	57.1	73.3
STRENGTH	40.4	34.9	47.6	53.3
STYLE	25.5	30.2	23.8	23.3

Note: All numbers are percentages.

At this point a caution must be made. It is very rare that any factor of surprise was used by itself, most appear with one or more other factors together. Table 6, shows this fact. From the table it becomes obvious that the more factors of surprise one accomplishes the higher the likelihood of victory there is.

When one or more factors of surprise were used victory was achieved 90.8%. For two or more it went to 93.9% and for three and above it was nearly a sure victory (98.2%).

Uses of the factors of surprise broke down by countries as follows. The United States used two factors 43% of the time compared to about 26% for the other countries. Conversely, for three factors used the United States was low at 17% while the other countries were about 30%. Use of two or more factors by the United Kingdom was low with 62% of the time and the other countries were about 74%. For three or more the Soviet achieved this almost half of the time while the other countries could only get slightly over one third. It should be noted that the Soviets when they did use 3 or more factors of surprise were able to achieve victory 100% of the time.

Earlier in this section the four factors of surprise, deception, warfare, and perception were discussed and were summarized in Table 1. Table 7 is more detailed on the element of surprise and outcome and is broken down by specific countries. There are four sections to Table 7. One

TABLE 6
NUMBER OF FACTORS & ACHIEVEMENT OF VICTORY OF SURPRISE

# OF FACTOR OF SURPRISE	UK			GERM			SOV			US			TOTAL		
	USED	VICTORY	V/U %	USED	VICTORY	V/U %	USED	VICTORY	V/U %	USED	VICTORY	V/U %	USED	VICTORY	V/U %
ZERO (0)	9	5	55	6	3	50	2	2	100	4	2	50	21	12	57
ONE (1)	9	5	55	6	5	83	4	3	75	3	3	100	22	16	73
TWO (2)	11	10	91	14	13	93	5	4	80	13	11	85	43	38	88
THREE (3)	13	13	100	13	13	100	7	7	100	5	5	100	38	36	100
FOUR (4)	5	5	100	4	3	75	2	2	100	3	3	100	14	13	93
FIVE (5)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	100	2	2	100	3	3	100

TABLE 7
SURPRISE & OUTCOME BY COUNTRY

	ALL		UK		GERM		SOV		US		BIG 4	
	#	Z	#	Z	#	Z	#	Z	#	Z	#	Z
# CASES	205	100	47	100	43	100	21	100	30	100	141	100
*SURP USED	159	77.6	37	78.7	36	83.7	19	90.5	25	83.3	117	83.0
**NO SURP USED	46	22.4	10	21.3	7	16.3	2	9.5	5	16.7	24	17.0
*SURP USED &	159	100	37	100	36	100	19	100	25	100	117	100
		(77.6)		(78.7)		(83.7)		(90.5)		(83.3)		(83.0)
VICTORY	146	91.8	33	89.2	34	94.4	17	89.5	23	92.0	107	91.5
		(71.2)		(70.2)		(79.1)		(81.0)		(76.7)		(75.9)
DEFEAT	13	8.2	4	10.8	2	5.6	2	10.5	2	8.0	10	8.5
		(6.3)		(8.5)		(4.7)		(9.5)		(6.7)		(7.1)
**												
NO SURP USED &	46	100	10	100	7	100	2	100	5	100	24	100
		(22.4)		(21.3)		(16.3)		(9.5)		(16.7)		(17.0)
VICTORY	17	37	4	40	2	28.6	0	0	3	60	9	37.5
		(8.3)		(8.5)		(4.7)		(0)		(10.0)		(6.4)
DEFEAT	29	63	6	60	5	71.4	2	100	2	40	15	62.5
		(14.1)		(12.8)		(11.6)		(9.5)		(6.7)		(10.6)
* CASES	205	100	47	100	43	100	21	100	30	100	141	100
VICTORY	163	79.5	37	78.7	36	83.7	17	81	26	86.7	116	82.3
DEFEAT	42	20.5	10	21.3	7	16.3	4	19	4	13.3	25	17.7

Note: Numbers in brackets reflect relationship within column & total cases

section covers surprise and in three subsections surprise is looked at in regard to victory and defeat.

From the table it can be seen that the Soviets use surprise the most 90.5% but when it came to translating that into victories they are rather lower on the list. Where all countries seem able to gain a victory without the use of surprise the Soviets in their attempts were unsuccessful. Another reason implied in this data for why the Soviets lean to the use of surprise is simply that when they use it, they win and when they do not, they lose.

A caution must be noted for the United States. A high victory average can be detrimental by giving one a false sense of security. There are too many stories where the underdog beat the favored champion. The likely adversary, the Soviets, do not have such a bad victory average themselves (81%).

E. DECEPTION: DOES IT AID SURPRISE?

The above sections and tables seem to indicate that the achievement of surprise in warfare is extremely important to increase the probability of a successful outcome. Additionally, it has been shown that several elements such as deception, warning and preconception aid in the achievement of surprise. It also has been shown that as the intensity of surprise increases or as the number of various factors of surprise increase so does the likelihood of success directly affected.

Earlier in this paper it was suggested that deception aids in the achievement of surprise and surprise was a stepping stone to victory. If this is true then how much deception is needed? Is there an optimum number of deceptive ruses needed to achieve surprise? This paper up to this point has looked extensively at surprise and victory. The importance of deception will now be examined. There are several questions that need to be answered. First, is there an optimal number of deceptive ruses and ploys that when attempted would increase the probability of surprise being achieved? The data in Table 8 shows the relationship between deceptive ruses and the achievement of surprise. The numbers in this table reflect only strategic cases. This was done for two reasons. One, the data was clearer and therefore easier to obtain for the strategic cases. Two, as has been briefly seen in passing from the previous tables and a fact that will be looked at closer later, there appears to be no significant difference between levels of conflict, strategic and tactical, when it comes to factors like surprise and deception. Even though the means of accomplishment are different, the goal of victory and the effects they cause are very similar. Therefore, one can make some inferences about all cases by only looking at one level. From Table 8 it is shown that the optimal threshold for achieving surprise is between two and three deceptive ruses.

A second question that needs to be answered, especially in light of the above findings is: How does the number of

TABLE 8
DECEPTION & SURPRISE

Number of Deceptive Ruses

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
NO SURPRISE	-	-	6.5	-	-	-	-
SURPRISE	-	2.2	49.5	21.5	12.9	7.5	-

Note: All numbers are percentages.

ruses used relate to the success of several factors of surprise? As was seen above from Table 8, 2-3 ruses are significant to ensure surprise and as was shown from Table 6, 2-3 factors of surprise are significant to ensure victory. It would be logical to conclude that deception does contribute highly when combined with surprise. However, from Table 9 one gets a clear picture of how the intensity of surprise is effected by the number or intensity of deceptive ruses used. As can be seen from the table when no deceptive ruses were used 72.6% of the cases were unable to achieve surprise. One would expect the more deceptive ruses used the greater the intensity of element of surprise would be. To a degree this is true. When between one and four ruses were used a higher level of surprise was able to be accomplished but beyond four ruses the gains are minimal. Unless one is trying to achieve a significantly higher level of surprise (4-5 factors), what may be gained in the trying is lost in the warning and increased response capability given to the intended victim. It would therefore appear the most effective combination of deceptive ruses used to surprise factors attempted would be 2-3 ruses for 2-3 factors of surprise. This would ensure a high probability of a successful outcome.

When a Pearson correlation was conducted on all variables of the data base, surprise and deception received one of the highest correlation ratings of (.64).

TABLE 9

INTENSITY OF DECEPTION & SURPRISE

		INTENSITY OF DECEPTIONS		
		0	1-4	5 or more
INTENSITY OF SURPRISE	0	72.6	6.4	6.3
	1	8.2	11.6	6.3
	2	9.6	41.0	18.7
	3	5.5	29.4	12.5
	4-5	4.1	11.6	56.2

Note: All numbers are percentages.

F. OTHER ELEMENTS

There are four other questions that must be addressed before the individual "styles" of the countries can be examined. First, does the impact of surprise, deception and warning vary significantly on the outcome of a conflict if the level of that conflict is strategic or tactical in nature? As one can see from Table 10 in all but one of eight categories all the results are alike for both strategic and tactical cases, and in most they are virtually the same. The only exception is in the tactical column where the use of deception is lower. However, in view of all the data that is present this is not thought to be a large disparity and this author feels that in respect to the use of surprise, deception and warning there are no real differences between their application in strategic or tactical uses. An interesting preview of the "Big Four" styles is shown in Table 11. From the table one can see that both the United Kingdom and United States have better success winning tactical battles than they do for winning strategic campaigns. The reverse is true for the Germans and Soviets, for they are both strategically undefeated while only about 75% successful in their tactical battles.

A second question that remains concerns the possibility of patterns in the use of a particular day of the week. Are there days where victory or surprise are achieved more? Are there days that should be avoided because it would appear that it was a disadvantage to use them? Table 12 shows a daily

TABLE 10

SURPRISE, DECEPTION & WARNING
BY STRATEGIC/TACTICAL LEVELS

	STRATEGIC		TACTICAL	
	# CASES	%*	CASES	%*
SURPRISE USED	40	78.4	119	78.3
SURPRISE VICTORY	37	92.5	109	91.6
DECEPTION USED	40	78.4	99	65.1
DECEPTION VICTORY	35	87.4	90	90.9
NO WARNING	12	23.5	36	23.7
NO WARNING VICTORY	12	100	35	97.2
WARNING	39	76.5	116	76.3
WARNING VICTORY	30	76.9	86	74.1

Note: Total case: (1) Strategic (51) Tactical (152)

TABLE 11
VICTORY BY COUNTRY

AVERAGE

COUNTRY	STRATEGIC	TACTICAL	OVERALL AVERAGE
UK	60	81	79
GERM	100	79	84
SOV	100	73	81
U.S.	80	100	87

TABLE 12
DAILY BREAKDOWN BY OUTCOME OR BY SURPRISE

	SAT		FRI		THUR		WED		TUE		MON		SUN	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
DAILY BREAKDOWN	23	13.7	19	11.3	25	14.9	17	10.1	24	14.3	31	18.5	29	17.3
VICTORY	18	78.3	17	89.5	23	92	13	76.5	17	70.8	23	74.2	21	72.4
DEFEAT	5	21.7	2	10.5	2	8	4	23.5	7	29.2	8	25.8	8	27.6
USED	16	69.6	18	94.7	22	88	14	82.4	17	70.8	21	67.7	20	69
NOT USED	7	30.4	1	5.3	3	12	3	17.6	7	29.2	10	32.3	9	31

breakdown as to the number of times a particular day was used to initiate a battle and how each day stands in respect to outcome and surprise. The table shows that there is no individual day which stands out as the singularly most often used day. The average amount any one day was used was 14.3 percent, with the range being only between 10.1% and 18.5%. It appears that every day has been used almost equally. Monday and Sunday are slightly higher in their use while Wednesday and Friday being slightly lower. The other days are grouped together at the norm. When one looks at Table 12 to see what day was more likely to result in a victory or a defeat there is almost a complete polarization among the days. It appears that Thursday (92%) and Friday (90%) are two days where on the average victory occurred 91% of the time. While all of the other five days, victories were at a much level (74%). When one looks at the data on surprise an even more pronounced separation occurs. Friday (95%) is the most successful day with Thursday (88%) and Wednesday (82%) close behind. Where the average for surprise utilization for these three days is 89% the other four days only average about 69%.

Table 13 is a further breakdown of Table 12 and cross tabulates the days of the week with how outcome (victory and defeat) and surprise (used and not used) interrelate. This table again shows that for most attacks, regardless of the day on which they occur, if surprise was used the outcome ended in victory 91.4% of the time. It should also be noted

TABLE 13

DAILY BREAKDOWN BY OUTCOME & SURPRISE

V I C T O R Y	SURPRISE	SAT	FRI	THUR	WED	TUE	MON	SUN
		15	17	21	12	15	19	18
D E F E A T	NO SURPRISE	3	0	2	1	2	4	3
		1	1	1	2	2	2	2
D E F E A T	NO SURPRISE	4	1	1	2	5	6	6

that victories do occur without surprise and conversely defeats occur with surprise. However, for both of these combinations they happen less than ten percent of the time.

To see if any of the "Big Four" countries showed a preference and/or an abnormally high success rate in regard to days of the week, Tables 14 and 15 were developed.

The following daily profiles for each country can be gleaned from these tables: The British appear to favor no particular day and utilize the days equally with Monday only a slight favorite. However, on Monday as well as Tuesday the British have their lowest success rate. Thursday provides their highest. For Germany Sunday is favored, followed by equal use of Friday, Tuesday and Monday. However, only Friday brings them high success. The Soviets, more so than any other country, favor the use of two particular days; Thursday followed by Sunday. Between these two days almost two thirds of all Soviet cases were conducted. A second interesting outcome of the data is Soviet non-use of Wednesday, and non-victories on Monday. The Soviets success rate is perfect four of the other five days and 80% on the remainder.

The United States prefers to use Thursday and Monday followed by Tuesday. The United States, like the Soviets, do not like to attack on Wednesday, nor Sunday, maybe with good reason, for these days brings poor results.

One final note on the choice of day for attack. Where a lot has been written on the concept of using the weekend to achieve surprise and obtain victory, from the data shown

TABLE 14

DAILY BREAKDOWN BY COUNTRY/UTILIZATION

	SAT	FRI	THUR	WED	TUE	MON	SUN
ALL CASES	13.7	11.3	14.9	10.1	14.3	18.5	17.3
UK	13.6	11.4	13.6	15.9	11.4	18.2	15.9
GERM	8.8	17.6	8.8	5.9	17.6	17.6	23.5
SOV	14.3	7.1	35.7	0	7.1	7.1	28.6
U.S.	11.1	14.8	22.2	3.7	18.5	22.2	7.4

Note: All numbers in percentages.

TABLE 15
DAILY BREAKDOWN OF VICTORIES BY COUNTRY

	SAT	FRI	THUR	WED	TUE	MON	SUN
ALL CASES	78.3	89.5	92	76.5	70.8	74.2	72.4
UK	83	80	100	86	60	63	71
GERM	33	100	100	100	67	83	75
SOVIET	100	100	80	0	100	0	100
U.S.	100	100	83	0	100	83	50

Note: All numbers in percentages.

both Saturday and Sunday are rather low on the attainment of either of these objectives and, strikingly, Friday and Thursday come out to be the two days where surprise and victory are most often obtained.

After looking at days to see if the use of one is more advantageous than another the next logical area to explore is the choice of time or time period where victory or surprise may be more likely to occur. Tables 16 and 17 do just that. To simplify the tables the results were grouped into three time periods. Night or Dawn (2200-0559), Morning (0600-1359), and Afternoon (1400-2159). From Table 16 one sees that overall the night time period is used significantly more than the other two yet the attainment of victory is almost equally probable in any of the three time periods. These results change slightly when the data of the "Big Four" is compared. The United Kingdom and Germany follow this night time trend while the Soviets and the United States favor the morning time period and with much more success. With the exception of Germany the other three countries have both a lower use rate and a significantly lower victory rate during the afternoon time period.

Two additional points to come out from Table 17 are: First, the fact that more than half of the cases that used surprise tried it during the night time period. When surprise was not chosen to be used the attack time appears to shift to the morning period. Looking at the time period in relationship to victory or defeat one finds that of all victorious

TABLE 16
TIME PERIODS USED & VICTORIES BY COUNTRY

COUNTRY		NIGHT (22-6)	MORNING (6-14)	AFTERNOON (14-22)
ALL	USED	58.6	32.5	8.9
	VICTORY	81.5	78.8	72.2
UK	USED	68	28	4
	VICTORY	78	85	50
GERM	USED	65	16	9
	VICTORY	89	71	75
SOV	USED	43	52	5
	VICTORY	78	91	0
U.S.	USED	41	52	7
	VICTORY	83	93	50
BIG 4	USED	57.9	32.9	9.3
	VICTORY	82.7	87.0	61.5

Note: All numbers are percentages.

TABLE 17

TIME PERIODS; SURPRISE & OUTCOME

SPECIFIC CASES	NIGHT	MORNING	AFTERNOON	TOTAL
SURPRISE CASES	52.7	39.8	7.5	100
NO SURPRISE CASES	23.7	57.9	18.4	100
VICTORY CASES	60	32	8	100
DEFEAT CASES	54	34	12	100

cases 60% of them occurred at night and likewise 54% of all defeats occurred at night.

Another element that needs to be examined is the relationship between the force strength of opposing countries and the use of surprise. Barton Whaley explains in his book that it is popularly believed that the force ratio for successful attack is 3:1 superiority. The data shows that without the use of surprise this force ratio for success was closer to 2:1 and supports the belief that the more force one has the greater the success. From Table 18, one can see that with the input of surprise in the force ratio equation the relationship between force and success is altered. The reason for this is that surprise has the effect of being "a force multiplier" [Ref. 15] and geometrically shifts the advantage to the side who uses it.

G. A PREVIEW OF SOVIET "STYLE"

What is the Soviet style of conducting a war in the initial phase of that war and particularly in their use of surprise?

One often reads about the Soviet paranoia about their security and the importance placed on the protection and defense of the homeland from the invasion of the Capitalist countries. It is difficult to believe that a country with the present day military might and capability that the Soviets have at their disposal would still cling to this notion. But might this be part of their style? One does not have to go

TABLE 18

FORCE USED TO GAIN OBJECTIVES AFTER WWI

OUTCOME	SURPRISE		NO SURPRISE	
	#	FORCE RATIO	#	FORCE RATIO
VICTORY	18	1.2:1	1	2.5:1
ABOUT AS PLANNED	28	1.1:1	4	1.4:1
BELOW EXPECTATION	17	1.4:1	9	1.4:1
DEFEAT	4	1.0:1	20	0.9:1

too far back in history to see this fear and style exhibited. The following are three recent events that involved the Soviet Union seem to point to a prevailing style. About two years ago on 1 September 1983 the Soviet Union scrambled fighters to investigate an unidentified air contact that was in Soviet airspace. From open sources, although not conclusive, it appears that the Soviets intentionally shot down Korean Airlines, KL-007, knowing it was an unarmed civilian aircraft. The plane was destroyed with the loss of all aboard.

In April of the next year the Soviet head of air defense force evaluated this event in Pravda by saying:

"The termination of the provocation prepared by American special services using a South Korean aircraft ... was a historical example of the air defense high level of readiness to perform their military duty." [Ref. 16]

The rhetoric from the Soviet political leaders still stressed peaceful coexistence. The Western world was shocked and called it murder.

In March of of this year an unarmed American officer authorized to be where he was and in full compliance with legal international agreement was shot and left to die while medical aid could have been rendered. The dead officer was Army Major Arthur Nicholson. In a day where spying is so sophisticated and common place the fact that an act out of a novel or action movie could be accomplished in real life is almost unbelievable. The Soviets call him a spy. The United States called it murder.

In April of this year in a local Sunday paper the editorial story "Soviet Military Instruction" was featured. In the article the author tells of a teacher who heroically gave his life for his student. He was killed when he fell on top of a live hand grenade in an effort to absorb its effects. However, this was not a battlefield. This was a Middle School classroom in which students were receiving mandatory military instruction. Unfortunately a live grenade was mixed in with inert training grenades. The article goes on to say:

"The children's manual which teaches 'hatred for the enemies of Socialism', also teaches assembly of machine guns and the use of bayonets and rifle butts in the 'decisive armed conflict of the two opposing world systems', a conflict that will involve 'vast casualties on an unprecedented scale'" [Ref. 17]

Scholars would have us believe that what one teaches our young people today will become their moral fiber and essence of tomorrow. How different are the lessons Soviet children receive. How different are the fibers that make up Soviet thought. There can not be any question, in view of these events and others like them, that Soviet thought is fundamentally different from Western thinking. Yet there are signs that the Soviets have taken lessons from other countries. The military of the Soviet Union, especially its army, is viewed as one of massive size and force with little flexibility. This could not be further from the truth. Soviet doctrine stresses mobility and destroying the enemy's will as well as his means to fight. The Soviets learned that

lesson the hard way from the Germans Blitzkrieg in World War II.

A point that commonly appears in articles about the arms race between the United States and the USSR, is how the development of the Soviet Armed forces, both army and navy parallel the United States in construction and tactics. If one compares the "Big Four" from the data presented in the last section it appears that in many factors the Soviet are extremely close in their behavior with that of the Germans and in others they are very similar to the United States. Later in this section we will examine this aspect more closely.

It is interesting to note that much of modern Soviet doctrine can find its bases from two primary sources. The first comes from Germany, a nation whom she soundly defeated in World War II or from the United States, a nation whom she is struggling with today and who well might be her opponent in the next world war.

The Soviets attach great importance to the initial phase of a war. To them it is a pivotal period and all other actions are consequences of what is done there. This fact helps explain the keen interest that the Soviets have in factors such as surprise and deception and the use of rapid mobility to take advantage of the effects achieved by these factors. The Soviet philosophy of being ready, in all respects, before a conflict starts is an important idea the West would do well to remember. For in today's high-tech society and with

weapons of massive fire power if one is not ready at the start of a conflict there may not be time to produce or even mobilize reserves before the conflict gets beyond a country's ability to salvage the situation. This "ready now" philosophy also aids in taking advantage to the maximum extent possible the gains achievable in the initial phase of hostilities. It seems logical to say that part of the Soviet style and strategy would have to incorporate a highly mobile fighting force that uses deception in order to achieve surprise during the initial period of the war.

H. AN ANALYSIS OF "THE STYLE OF SURPRISE"

In an effort to discern what makes up the Soviet style and to see what particular variable contributes to it, several methods were tried. How this style relates to styles of other countries was also examined. The following four procedures were accomplished:

- 1) The data from all the previous tables were separated by countries and country summary sheets were developed.
- 2) From these country summary sheets a "Big Four" composite and graphic display presentation was made.
- 3) Taking the data for the elements of surprise, deception and warning, for the "Big Four" countries, these three elements were plotted together. Two graph types were drawn, one used the element's percentage of times it was used, and the second used the element's victory achieved percentage. After these graphs were drawn some very interesting outcomes were evident.

The author calls these plots, Surprise-Deception-Warning (SDW) "biorhythms" because of their similarity to human biorhythms involving the three factors, emotional (E), physical (P) and intellectual (I). Their statistical value, just as the reality of their counterpart, are questionable, but this is another way to view and see graphically a difficult concept.

4) In order to see if any pattern might be developed from the variables of the data base, these variables were put through a process of factor analysis. From the final output of this analysis those variables which loaded heavily in the primary factors were further subjected to regression analysis in areas to determine if any pattern between the countries existed.

1. Country Summary Sheet

The country summary sheets, Tables 19-22, are self explanatory. From them one can find things such as which factors of surprise are preferred by a country, as well as how much a country used surprise, deception and warning. One can also find out the day of the week or time of day a country prefers to initiate an attack or are the most victorious.

2. Composite Graphic

The utility of the composite graphic, Table 23, is to compare the Soviets with the other countries with an eye for similar characteristics among them. Where there was a

TABLE 19

COUNTRY SUMMARY SHEET

SOVIET

1. FACTOR OF SURPRISE MOST USED:	PLACE & TIME
2. NR. OF FACTORS OF SURPRISE:	
a. 1 or more used:	90.5%
b. 2 or more used:	71.4%
c. 3 or more used:	47.6%
d. 1 or more used. victory:	89.5%
e. 2 or more used. victory:	93.3%
f. 3 or more used. victory:	100.0%
3. VICTORY AVERAGE:	
a. overall:	81%
b. strategic:	100%
c. tactical:	73%
4. DAY(S) PREFERRED TO ATTACK:	THURSDAY (36%) & SUNDAY (29%)
5. DAY(S) MOST VICTORIOUS:	FRI, SAT, SUN, TUESDAY (100%)
6. DAY(S) AVOIDED:	WEDNESDAY (0%)
7. DAY(S) LEAST VICTORIOUS:	WEDNESDAY & MONDAY (0%)
8. TIME PERIOD PREFERRED:	MORNING (52%)
9. TIME PERIOD MOST VICTORIOUS:	MORNING (91%)
10. SURPRISE USED:	91%
11. SURPRISE USED & VICTORY:	90%
12. DECEPTION USED:	72%
13. DECEPTION USED & VICTORY:	93%
14. WARNING USED:	86%
15. WARNING USED & VICTORY:	78%
16. PRECONCEPTION USED:	76%
17. PRECONCEPTION USED & VICTORY:	94%
18. VICTORY WITH SURPRISE PER TOTAL CASES:	81%
19. VICTORY WITH DECEPTION PER TOTAL CASES:	67%
20. VICTORY WITH WARNING PER TOTAL CASES:	67%
21. VICTORY WITH PRECONCEPTION PER TOTAL CASES:	71%

TABLE 20

COUNTRY SUMMARY SHEET

GERMANY

1. FACTOR OF SURPRISE MOST USED:	TIME
2. NR. OF FACTORS OF SURPRISE:	
a. 1 or more used:	86.0%
b. 2 or more used:	72.1%
c. 3 or more used:	39.5%
d. 1 or more used. victory:	91.9%
e. 2 or more used. victory:	93.5%
f. 3 or more used. victory:	94.1%
3. VICTORY AVERAGE	
a. overall:	83.7%
b. strategic:	100.0%
c. tactical:	79.0%
4. DAY(S) PREFERRED TO ATTACK:	SUNDAY (24%)
5. DAY(S) MOST VICTORIOUS:	WED, THUR, FRIDAY (100%)
6. DAY(S) AVOIDED:	WED (6%) & SAT (9%)
7. DAY(S) LEAST VICTORIOUS:	SATURDAY (33%)
8. TIME PERIOD PREFERRED:	NIGHT (65%)
9. TIME PERIOD MOST VICTORIOUS:	NIGHT (89%)
10. SURPRISE USED:	84%
11. SURPRISE USED & VICTORY:	94%
12. DECEPTION USED:	72%
13. DECEPTION USED & VICTORY:	90%
14. WARNING USED:	91%
15. WARNING USED & VICTORY:	82%
16. PRECONCEPTION USED:	51%
17. PRECONCEPTION USED & VICTORY:	96%
18. VICTORY WITH SURPRISE PER TOTAL CASES:	79%
19. VICTORY WITH DECEPTION PER TOTAL CASES:	65%
20. VICTORY WITH WARNING PER TOTAL CASES:	74%
21. VICTORY WITH PRECONCEPTION PER TOTAL CASES:	49%

TABLE 21

COUNTRY SUMMARY SHEET

UNITED STATES

1. FACTOR OF SURPRISE MOST USED:	PLACE
2. NR. OF FACTORS OF SURPRISE:	
a. 1 or more used:	86.7%
b. 2 or more used:	76.7%
c. 3 or more used:	33.3%
d. 1 or more used. victory:	92.3%
e. 2 or more used. victory:	91.3%
f. 3 or more used. victory:	100.0%
3. VICTORY AVERAGE:	
a. overall:	86.7%
b. strategic:	80.0%
c. tactical:	100.0%
4. DAY(S) PREFERRED TO ATTACK:	THUR & MON (22%)
5. DAY(S) MOST VICTORIOUS:	TUE, FRI, SATURDAY (100%)
6. DAY(S) AVOIDED:	WED (4%) & SUN (7%)
7. DAY(S) LEAST VICTORIOUS:	WEDNESDAY (0%)
8. TIME PERIOD PREFERRED:	MORNING (52%)
9. TIME PERIOD MOST VICTORIOUS:	MORNING (93%)
10. SURPRISE USED:	83%
11. SURPRISE USED & VICTORY:	92%
12. DECEPTION USED:	80%
13. DECEPTION USED & VICTORY:	92%
14. WARNING USED:	63%
15. WARNING USED & VICTORY:	79%
16. PRECONCEPTION USED:	77%
17. PRECONCEPTION USED & VICTORY:	96%
18. VICTORY WITH SURPRISE PER TOTAL CASES:	77%
19. VICTORY WITH DECEPTION PER TOTAL CASES:	73%
20. VICTORY WITH WARNING PER TOTAL CASES:	50%
21. VICTORY WITH PRECONCEPTION PER TOTAL CASES:	73%

TABLE 22

COUNTRY SUMMARY SHEET

UNITED KINGDOM

1. FACTOR OF SURPRISE MOST USED:	PLACE
2. NR. OF FACTORS OF SURPRISE:	
a. 1 or more used:	80.9%
b. 2 or more used:	61.7%
c. 3 or more used:	38.3%
d. 1 or more used, victory:	86.8%
e. 2 or more used, victory:	96.6%
f. 3 or more used, victory:	100.0%
3. VICTORY AVERAGE:	
a. overall:	78.7%
b. strategic:	60.0%
c. tactical:	81.0%
4. DAY(S) PREFERRED TO ATTACK:	MON (18%)
5. DAY(S) MOST VICTORIOUS:	THURSDAY (100%)
6. DAY(S) AVOIDED:	NONE
7. DAY(S) LEAST VICTORIOUS:	TUESDAY (60%)
8. TIME PERIOD PREFERRED:	NIGHT (68%)
9. TIME PERIOD MOST VICTORIOUS:	MORNING (82%)
10. SURPRISE USED:	79%
11. SURPRISE USED & VICTORY:	89%
12. DECEPTION USED:	72%
13. DECEPTION USED & VICTORY:	88%
14. WARNING USED:	57%
15. WARNING USED & VICTORY:	67%
16. PRECONCEPTION USED:	51%
17. PRECONCEPTION USED & VICTORY:	100%
18. VICTORY WITH SURPRISE PER TOTAL CASES:	70%
19. VICTORY WITH DECPETION PER TOTAL CASES:	64%
20. VICTORY WITH WARNING PER TOTAL CASES:	38%
21. VICTORY WITH PRECONCEPTION PER TOTAL CASES:	51%

TABLE 23

NR	LINE INDEX	COMPOSITE GRAPHIC			
		U.K.	GERMAN	SOVIET	U.S.
1	I T P I S T S				
2a	81838518789 91				US/GERM
b	6285687174 77				GERM
c	3336894245 48				
d	8788899091 92				
e	9192939495 97				
f	949596979899000				GERM
3a	79818385187				US
b	60703019000				
c	731778185899397				GERM
4	51 F Th W T M S				GERM
5	51 F Th W T M S				US
6	51 F Th W T M S				US
7	51 F Th W T M S				US/GERM
8	N M A S				US
9	N M A S				US
10	79818385818991				US
11	89901919293194				
12	71731757779181				
13	88891909192931				GERM
14	5764770788592				GERM
15	67001730679821				
16	515515953677175				US
17	948596979899100				
18	7072174767880182				GERM
19	646616870721741				GERM
20	3844150566268174				GERM
21	495315761656973				US


striking similiary it was noted in the far right column with what country the Soviets appear to be similar to. The Soviets appear to be like the Germans in the following five areas:

(1) In the use of surprise and in the intensity of surprise. (2) In their use of both deception and warning. (3) In their ability to prevent warning. (4) When it comes to victory percentage, both strategic and tactical cases, they are virtually the same. (5) These countries are parallel in victory percentage in relationship to their use of surprise and deception, plus their ability to win in spite of their opponents having received some warning. The Soviet parallel the Americans in three areas. (1) They both seem to use, avoid, and win on the same days. (2) When they initiate attacks they are victorious and prefer to start during the morning period (0600-1400). (3) Both the Soviets and the United States take great advantage of using one's enemy's preconceptions to achieve victorious outcomes.

3. Surprise-Deception-Warning (SDW) Biorhythm

The SDW biorhythm graphs, Tables 24-29, come up with an interesting result. For when these three key factors of surprise, deception and warning are plotted graphically those of the United States and the United Kingdom are almost parallel in design while those of the Soviets and Germans are equally similar in their design. A simple look at similar styles, i.e. the German-Soviet V-style and the United Kingdom and the United States inverted L-style.

TABLE 24






TABLE 26




TABLE 27




TABLE 28

SDW - BIORHYTHM

UNITED STATES





TABLE 29

SDW - BIORHYTHM

UNITED KINGDOM



UK
VICTORY

4. Analysis

a. Factor Analysis

The purpose of conducting a factor analysis was to reduce the 41 variables available in the data base, (for variables list see Table 30), to a smaller and more manageable number and to identify those key variables that were representative of the major trends in the data. For the factor analysis an orthogonal rotation method was used to group variables into separate factors where little correlation between the factors existed. This method was chosen in order to adhere to one of the prime rules for using the results obtained later in regression analysis.

On early execution of the factor analysis all variables were used with the exception of those variables that were determined not to be vital to the analysis. These were variables that either were administrative or organizational in nature (i.e. case number) or were data not statistically conducive to factor analysis (i.e. code number of operation). From the results of this early analysis three more variables were dropped (NRDOC, NRDOUBLE, NROTHER) because of their very low appearance in the data cases. Table 31 is a partial summary of the factor analysis done using 38 variables. This analysis produced 15 factors with a cumulative percentage of 78%. When all factors were plotted based on their eigen values a clear and distinctive separation occurred after the sixth factor. After this point the curve of this plot flattens out indicating the

TABLE 30

DATA BASE VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS

<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
CASE	Sequential case identification number
NINIT1	Name of country that initiated the attack
NVICT1	Name of country that is the target of the attack (victim)
FALERT	Number of times victim went on alert and attack never materialized
TIMECHG	Number of changes in time of planned operation
NSURP	Surprise achieved
NDECP	Deception attempted
NWARN	Warning given
STRATIO	Ratio of initiator's strength to victim's strength
NPHASE	Phase of a conflict during which a battle occurred
NENVIR	Environment
NMODE	The overall posture of the initiator of an attack
CASRATE	Ratio of initiator's casualties to victim's casualties
CASTIME	Days from D-Day that the casualty figure represents
TERCHG	Territory lost or won
TERTIME	Days from D-Day that the territorial change represents
NOUTCOME	Victor or defeat (initiator)
HHOUR	Hour operation was initiated

BOMBARD	Hour of preliminary artillery
NDDAY	Day of week battle took place
NWNAT	Natural weather conditions
NWART	Artificial weather conditions (ECM)
NUMBER	Number of types of surprise used
INDEX	Intensity of surprise
NCONCEPT	Victim's preconceptions used
NSUCCEED	Initiator successful in using preconceptions of victim
NINTENT	Intention factor of surprise
NTIME	Time factor of surprise
NPLACE	Place factor of surprise
NSTRENGT	Strength factor of surprise
NSTYLE	Style factor of surprise
RDEM	Number of time initiator demonstrated/ held military exercises or mobilizations
RFEINT	Number of false attacks
NRNEG	Negotiation used as a ruse
NRDOC	False documents used
NRPRESS	Leakage of deceptive information through the press/media
NRRUMOR	Rumors used
RTOTAL	Total number of ruses used
NRCAM	Camouflage used
NRRADIO	Deceptive information given on military radio
NRDOUBLE	Double agents used
NROTHER	Other types of ruses used

TABLE 31
RESULTS OF 38 VARIABLE FACTOR ANALYSIS

VARIABLES	FACTORS							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
NRPRESS	93							
NRRUMOR	91							
RTOTAL	80							
NRRADIO	71							
NDECP	65							
NSUCCEED		86						
NCONCEPT		82						
INDEX		60						
NUMBER		59						
NRNEG			74					
FALERT			69					
NSURP				79				
NWARN				-61				
NOUTCOME				60				
CASTIME					83			
TERTIME					73			
NSTYLE						89		
TIMECHG						60		
NVICT1							72	
NINIT1							70	
NWART								-84
CUM PCT	14.1	23.3	30.2	36.6	42.2	47.5	51.6	55.5

remaining factors below this break contribute significantly less.

As can be seen from Table 31, factor number one are all variables associated with deception. As one continues to review the factors one can see that the five factors of surprise are poorly represented in the first eight factors. In order to see if the mere number (12) of deception variables so out weighted the surprise variables another factor analysis was done. Taking the 21 variables listed in Table 31 as a starting point factor NR 1 variables (except the general variable of deception NDECP) were removed. The surprise variables plus two deception variables (NRCAM, RDEM) showed promise as being important variables but were overshadowed by other deception variables. Finally, 15 variables were selected and a factor analysis conducted. The results are shown in Table 32. Seven factors were produced which yielded a cumulative percentage of 71%, a little better output as compared to the original 15 factors on 78% cumulative percent. When the factors were plotted by their eigen values a clear break showed up this time after the third factor.

When one compares Table 31 with Table 32 many similarities can be seen. For example, factor number two in Table 31 is almost identical with factor number one in Table 32. Factor number seven in Table 31 is identical with factor number three in Table 32. With these similarities and the placement of where the significant breaks occurred in the

TABLE 32
RESULTS OF 15 VARIABLE FACTOR ANALYSIS

FACTORS							
VARIABLES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
NSUCCEED	75						
NSURP	70						
INDEX	64						
NPLACE	56						
NSTYLE		68					
NSTRENGT		66					
NINIT1			81				
NVICT1			70				
NRNEG				78			
NTIME				68			
NWARN					83		
NRCAM						90	
NINTENT						52	
RDEM							90
NDECP							52
CUM PCT	16.3	30.4	41.2	49.8	57.8	64.7	71.4

eigen value plots, a composite factor grouping consisting of two tables (31 and 32) was accomplished and shown as Table 33.

Table 33 shows what appears to be eight key factors which can explain about 75-80% of what make up modern warfare. A summary of the eight factors and what they represent follow:

Factor one is a grouping of variables that are all related to deception and the attempt by a country to actively misinform an intended victim.

Factor two is made up of surprise related variables and preconception variables which, as was shown earlier, help significantly to achieve surprise.

Factor three is the warning variable.

Factor four is the outcome variable.

Factor five and six can be grouped together as different ways to describe a country's doctrine or the theoretical manner in which they conduct war and war related politics.

Factor seven is the relationship of the hostile parties involved in a conflict.

Factor eight is a grouping of deception variables which are used in an effort to hide one's intentions and physical capabilities from one's enemy.

At this stage these 22 variables were linked one last time prior to being subject to regression analysis. It was determined that only 18 of the 22 variables were suited as independent regression variables. The variable NSUCCEED

TABLE 33

COMPOSITE FACTOR ANALYSIS

FACTOR 1	NRPRESS	-	DECEPTION
	NRRUMOR		(MISINFORMATION OR DISINFORMATION)
	NRRADIO		
	RDEM		
FACTOR 2	NDECP		
	NSUCCEED	-	SURPRISE & PRECONCEPTION
	NCONCEPT		
	INDEX		
FACTOR 3	NSURP		
	NPLACE		
	NWARN	-	WARNING
FACTOR 4	NOUTCOME	-	OUTCOME
	NSTYLE	-	
FACTOR 5	TIMECHG		
	NSTRENGT		STYLE - POLITICAL/MILITARY MANNER & DOCTRINE
FACTOR 6	NRNEG	-	
	FALERT		
	NTIME		
FACTOR 7	NVICT1	-	RELATIONSHIP OF HOSTILE PARTIES
	NINIT1		
FACTOR 8	NRCAM	-	DECEPTION
	NINTENT		(HIDE & KEEP SECRET INTENTIONS)

was dropped due to its high correlation with NCONCEPT. Additionally, NOUTCOME was used as the dependent variable in the regression equation. NCONCEPT expressed a variable that represents an input used prior to the final outcome was known, where NSUCCEED was only known after the outcome was available. The fourth variable NPLACE was dropped due to relatively low position in a factor that is already represented by three other variables.

b. Regression Analysis

War is initiated and conducted in different ways by various countries. The outcome of their efforts are a function of many variables. From the factor analysis there appears to be 8 factors and about 20 variables that are involved in most conflict/war-like action. The aim of this section is to see if these variables or any combination of these variables are significant and to show by country what variables contribute to a country's final outcome in battle. This information together with the country summary sheets already discussed will give a good insight into what makes up a country's "style" of fighting.

Table 34 is the results obtained from several regression analyses which had as their dependent variable, NOUTCOME. The variable NINIT 1 was used to be able to select data by country and the 18 variables from the composite factor analysis (see Table 33). As can be seen from the table the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States had

TABLE 34
REGRESSION ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY

COUNTRY	DEPENDENT VARIABLE	CONSTANT	INDEPENDENT VARIABLES						R-SQUARE	P-STATISTIC
UK	MOUTCOME =	-1.27 (-.8)	+46 (MRCAM) (3.0)	+39 (MRCF) (2.5)	+24 (MRCF) (1.8)	+72 (MRCAM) (3.3)	-64 (MRCF) (-2.9)	-30 (MRCF) (-2.3)	.46	4.56
GERM	MOUTCOME =	-1.39 (-.5)	+64 (MRCF) (5.1)	+40 (MRCF) (3.2)					.47	15.71
SOV	MOUTCOME =	1.30 (5.6)	-72 (MRCF) (-5.0)	+28 (MRCF) (2.0)	-67 (MRCF) (-3.4)	-65 (MRCF) (3.9)	-70 (MRCF) (-4.0)	-45 (MRCAM) (-3.7)	.93	9.95
US	MOUTCOME =	5.67 (7.9)	-58 (MRCF) (-3.1)	+33 (MRCF) (1.8)	-33 (MRCAM) (-1.9)	-39 (MRCF) (-2.5)			.42	4.12
ALL COUNTRIES	MOUTCOME =	1.98 (3.3)	+37 (MRCF) (5.3)	-13 (MRCF) (-1.8)	+15 (MRCF) (2.0)	-18 (MRCF) (-2.6)	-14 (MRCAM) (-2.0)	+13 (MRCF) (1.9)	.25	9.15

Notes: (1) Independent variables are standardized scores.
(2) Number in brackets are t-scores.

six, two and four significant variables appear in their respective regression equation. The Soviets had a high of ten variables in their equation. The interesting thing to note is that the value of the F statistic for the four equations are all significant but for the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States R-square is only about .45, whereas for the Soviets R-square is .93. What this means is that all the equations accurately reflect the data for each country. However, in the three equations for the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States the variables only explain about 45% of the dependent variable outcome achieved by those countries. In the Soviet's case these ten variables listed account for almost all the values of the dependent variable (93%).

At this point all other countries were put aside and the rest of the analysis was done on the Soviet data. As a matter of practice it is not desirable to have too many variables in a regression model. In an effort to reduce the number of variables to only those variables that make an important contribution to the effectiveness of the equation a step wise regression of the ten Soviet variables was accomplished and the results are tabulated in Table 35. Using this method one can objectively assess the magnitude of the mathematical relationship among the variables and see how each individual variable is affected by the inclusion of another variable into the equation. Key points to look for are stability in the variable value with a correspondingly

TABLE 35
SOVIET STEPWISE REGRESSION (10 VARS)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	TIMEING	FORM	MOONCHPT	WINDCP	WINDTENT	WRCAM	WRTRESS	WRCADIO	WRTENOR	WRTCTI	R- SQUARE	F- STATISTIC
MONTHCOME	-1.25 (-3.1)										.36	10.9
	-1.05 (-3.1)	-.20 (-.3)									.39	5.2
	-.90 (-2.3)	-.34 (-.43)	-.20 (-1.2)								.44	4.0
	-.90 (-2.1)	-.34 (-.42)	-.20 (-1.2)	.02 (.15)							.45	2.8
	-.80 (-2.0)	.04 (.05)	-.30 (-1.3)	.05 (-.3)	-.13						.50	2.6
	-.80 (-2.3)	.40 (.50)	-.30 (-2.0)	-.13 (-.6)	-.11 (-1.2)						.68	4.3
	-.80 (-2.2)	.40 (.50)	-.30 (-1.3)	-.12 (-.7)	-.10 (-1.0)	-.28 (-2.1)	.03 (.20)				.68	3.4
	-.80 (-2.7)	1.30 (1.80)	-.60 (-2.8)	-.40 (-2.3)	-.29 (-2.7)	-.34 (-3.2)	-.06 (-.8)	-.23 (-2.6)			.81	5.4
	-1.00 (-4.1)	.90 (1.50)	-.50 (-2.6)	-.40 (-3.0)	-.27 (-3.2)	-.29 (-3.3)	-.18 (-2.1)	-.24 (-3.3)	.22 (2.6)		.89	8.3
	-1.23 (-3.0)	1.10 (2.0)	-.60 (-3.4)	-.50 (-3.9)	-.31 (-4.0)	-.28 (-3.7)	-.25 (-2.9)	-.22 (-3.5)	.22 (3.0)	-.09 (-1.9)	.93	10.0

Notes: Numbers in bracket = t-scores.

significant t-statistic (normally > 2), plus an increase variable contribution showing up normally in an increase in either or both R-square and the F-statistic.

As can be seen the variables RDEM, NDECP, NRPRESS violate these principles as their variable weight value changes significantly as other variables are added plus they add little contribution to the regression equation:

RDEM	R-square	.36 - .39	F-statistic	10.9 - 5.2
NDECP	R-square	.44 - .45	F-statistic	4.0 - 2.8
NRPRESS	R-square	.68 - .68	F-statistic	4.3 - 3.4

These variables were dropped and another stepwise regression was conducted using the remaining seven variables. The results are shown in Table 36. Where the ten variables had a R-square of .93, this seven variable regression equation had a R-square of .77. The same process conducted with Table 35 was done to Table 36.

Four additional variables showed signs of weak contribution to the regression equation:

NCONCEPT	R-square	.36 - .44	F-statistic	10.90 - 6.24
NINTENT	R-square	.44 - .49	F-statistic	6.24 - 4.88
NRADIO	R-square	.66 - .70	F-statistic	6.82 - 6.00
NVICT 1	R-square	.77 - .77	F-statistic	6.63 - 5.21

These four variables were dropped and a three variable regression analysis was conducted with the results being shown in Table 37. R-square for this three variable equation was .71, a figure which is quite significant when noted that the ten variable was .93 and the 7 variable was .77.

TABLE 36
SOVIET STEPWISE REGRESSION (7 VARS)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	TIMECHG	NCONCEPT	NINTEMT	NRCAM	NRRADIO	NRRUMOR	NVICT1	R- SQUARE	F- STATISTIC
NOUTCOME	-1.25 (-3.3)							.36	10.90
	-.94 (-2.78)	-.19 (-1.18)						.44	6.24
	-.76 (-2.12)	-.27 (-1.57)	-.12 (-1.28)					.49	4.88
	-.69 (-2.24)	-.30 (-2.05)	-.07 (-.90)	-.27 (-2.63)				.66	6.82
	-.65 (-2.15)	-.37 (-2.41)	-.10 (-.90)	-.25 (-2.53)	-.09 (-1.26)			.70	6.00
	-.92 (-2.97)	-.15 (-.85)	-.09 (-1.21)	-.18 (-1.84)	-.09 (-1.34)	.17 (1.91)		.77	6.63
	-.92 (-2.63)	-.18 (-.81)	-.09 (-1.16)	-.18 (-1.71)	-.09 (-1.34)	.17 (1.81)	0 (.02)	.77	5.21

Note: Numbers in bracket = t-scores.

TABLE 37

SOVIET STEPWISE REGRESSION (3 VARS)

	TIMECHG	NRRUMOR	NRCAM	R-SQUARE	F-STATISTIC
NOUTCOME	-1.07 (-3.29)			.39	10.85
	-1.19 (-4.47)	.22 (3.16)		.62	13.28
	-1.09 (-4.53)	.19 (2.94)	-.20 (-2.25)	.72	12.81

Note: Numbers in bracket = t-scores.

This three variable equation, consisting of:

(1) TIMECHG, which represents the number of times D-day was postponed or advanced from the original attack plan. (2) NRRUMOR, which represents whether or not the Soviets used disinformation in the form of rumors prior to and during an engagement. (3) NRCAM, which represents whether or not the Soviets employed the use of camouflage prior to and during and engagement. These three variables can be used to correctly forecast the outcome of a Soviet battle 71% of the time. However this equation, its variables and the assumptions about the data base needs to be further researched, especially to see if values for these variables can be accurately established and outcomes determined prior to a Soviet crisis. This problem is beyond the scope of this paper and probably its classification, but the author believes that a solution is possible and would recommend one starting by looking at how the Soviets calculate what they call the "Correlation of Forces".

As a check of the accuracy of this model the 19 Soviet cases where surprise and/or deception was used were re-examined and the values for these variables for each case were applied to this model. The results were that in 18 of the 19 cases for a 94.7% accuracy rate. Additionally, even if one includes C types cases where information on the variables was not applicable or was not available the outcome was still predicted correctly a high and accuracy percentage of the time (85.7%)

5. Further Investigation

Additional investigation was conducted of these three variables because of the significant results produced by both the three variable regression equation plus the results of its application to the case studies. From the equation it appears the variable time change by far has the biggest impact on the final outcome.

Table 38 shows how well the "Big Four" were able to conduct their attacks as scheduled. The Soviets were the best at getting their attack off on time in more than half of the cases. If one takes a range about D-Day of +1 to -1, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States only get their attacks off close to schedule about 73% of the time. The Soviets accomplish this almost 91% of the time. This figure seems to support the idea that the Soviets are precise in their approach to all matters including warfare and use their time schedules faithfully.

Table 39 reduces Table 38 to three categories of time changes: on schedule, behind schedule, or ahead of schedule. This table further supports the previous supposition that the Soviets are rarely late (18.1%) where the other three countries are all late about 50% of the time. Additionally, in over a quarter of the Soviet attacks, they attacked early. The other countries are all below 10% for early attacks.

TABLE 38

NUMBER OF TIMES COUNTRIES CHANGE THEIR SCHEDULES

TIMECHG	U.K.		GERM		SOV		U.S.	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
-2	2	4.3	1	2.1	1	4.5	0	0
-1	3	6.4	2	4.3	5	22.7	2	5.4
0	22	46.8	20	42.6	12	54.5	16	43.2
1	12	25.5	11	23.4	3	13.6	8	21.6
2	7	14.9	3	6.4	1	4.5	5	13.5
3	1	2.1	0	0	0	0	4	10.8
4 or more	0	0	10	21.3	0	0	2	5.4
TOTAL	47	100	47	100	22	100	37	100

TABLE 39
SCHEDULE CHANGE SUMMARY BY COUNTRY

TIMECHG	UK	GERM	SOV	U.S.
DELAYED	42.6	51.6	18.1	51.4
ON TIME	46.8	42.6	54.5	43.2
AHEAD	10.6	6.4	27.2	5.4
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Note: All numbers are percentages.

From Table 40 two observations can be made. First, it appears that it is not an advantage to be on time if one wants to achieve surprise. Second, it would also appear if one is not going to be on schedule and wants to maximize his chance of achieving surprise one should attack ahead of schedule. When one combines this second observation with the fact that the Soviets have attacked early in over a quarter of their cases it once again supports the theme of the Soviet style utilizing the element of surprise wherever, however and whenever possible.

When further investigation was done on the other two variables, NRCAM and NRRUMOR nothing as striking, as was for the variable TIMECHG, was found in either the relationship to the Soviets or the other three countries. However, the Soviets place great importance on deception and the achievement of surprise as is evident by these elements being sighted in many of Soviet writings on military operations. Camouflage and misinformation techniques are continuously mentioned as means to accomplish these items.

I. THE MANCHURIAN MODEL

"We are taking into consideration the lessons
of the past and we are doing everything
so that nobody takes us by surprise."

Leonid Brezhnev

TABLE 40
SCHEDULE CHANGE & SURPRISE

TIMECHG	SURPRISE	NO SURPRISE
DELAYED	45.6	41.0
ON TIME	47.5	57.4
AHEAD	6.9	1.6

Note: All numbers are percentages.

During the last month of the Second World War the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Only a few months earlier these two nations were joined together in a non-aggression treaty but on 9 August 1945 the Soviet Union invaded Japanese held Manchuria.

Why is this campaign held up as a kind of "model" or "prototype" for Soviet offensive operations? The answer lies in the examination of three related areas. First, one must understand the historical background surrounding this campaign. Second, one must know how much significance is placed on this campaign, both by the Soviet and the West. Third, one must review the lessons that can be learned from this campaign. The first two of these areas will be dealt with in this section while the third will be discussed during the review of the case studies in Part III.

1. Historical Views

There is an old saying that "history belongs to the victor". In the case of Manchuria this fact is definitely true. If one looks through histories of the Western world they will find little mention of this campaign. If it is mentioned it is dismissed as a Soviet last-minute attempt to obtain any and all the land it could before the final defeat of Japan. Most Western historians play down the importance of this Soviet entry into war with the Japanese because it came after the dropping of the first atomic bomb and occurred almost simultaneously with the dropping of the second. Western

historians tend to feel that the Japanese were already defeated and the final outcome of the war was not altered by this Soviet attack.

Soviet historians and military writers, as would be expected, see things quite differently. The following is taken from a Soviet journal which clearly expresses their view of this campaign.

"No objective scholar can deny that it was the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan that led to its swift and victorious consummation, altered the very nature of the war in the Pacific and deprived U.S. ruling circles of the chance to establish their domination over the ruins of the Japanese "co-prosperity sphere". But the professional apologists of U.S. imperialism, ignoring the fact, vainly try to rewrite history.

But the evidence of history, as the saying goes, is the best witness.

Only the rout by the Soviet forces of the million-strong Kwantung army, Japan's chief military force on the Asian mainland, led to the swift end of the war in the Far East and the unconditional surrender of imperialist Japan." [Ref. 13]

In the opinion of this author neither the Western nor the Soviet views are correct. The Western view does not give credit to the Soviets for the several months it took to plan and prepare for an attack of this size. Additionally, both the U.S. and Britain asked for Soviet help and the attack was conducted with the anticipation that the war might last several months longer. Based on these two points it is felt that the Western claim that the Soviet attack was a last-minute operation is entirely false and without merit. The Soviet view is also too one-sided, narrow and self-satisfied.

The Soviets also give no credit to what the U.S. already had accomplished in the Pacific in addition to the atomic bomb. So what is the truth? This author believes one probably can find it somewhere between these two views.

2. The Importance of the Manchurian Campaign

The cultural tendency of the Soviet Union has made its people more aware of its historical background than the people of the U.S. The Soviet Union uses World War II (The Great Patriotic War) as a kind of laboratory where lessons can be learned and future applications can be derived. During the period around the Sino-Soviet breakup (1960) a vast amount of material on the Far East and the Manchurian campaign was written. Western analysts who reviewed these articles saw the Soviets using their experiences in the Far East during World War II, updating it and applying it to current situations. One such analyst was John Erickson who said: "The Soviet Manchurian campaign in 1945 closely approaches in style and scope what the Soviet command presently envisages in the way of high speed ground operations ... the Far East campaign is a much more realistic model than the majority of the operations in the European theater." [Ref. 19] To encapsulate the Soviet view of this campaign written during this period Marshal Malinovsky wrote: "The concluding campaign of World War II, executed by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East, was a new stride in the development of Soviet military art. Many moments of preparation and conduct

III. THREE CASE STUDIES OF SOVIET SURPRISE

In previous sections this paper has examined what is surprise and tried to establish a Soviet style of war-fighting based on computer analysis. In the last chapter the Manchurian model summarized what the Soviets hold as an example of what all campaigns should be like if one wants to achieve the maximum results from a surprise attack. It was during this campaign that the Soviets believe they received their graduation diploma from the, how to use surprise, school of higher learning. Part III will look at the offensive nature of Soviet military operations in three Soviet campaigns; Manchuria, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. In an effort to see why there is such a strong emphasis placed on the use of surprise in warfare by the Soviets. Additionally, this part will also look at what the Soviets did and what methods the Soviets employed in order to achieve surprise.

A. MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN

1. Background; Manchurian Campaign

During the 1930's conflict and crisis were all around and war was an ever present possibility. It was at this time that both Germany and Japan were rearming themselves military and becoming increasingly bold and adventurous. The question being asked was not if war was going to happen, but where would it happen and when.

With the Japanese in Manchuria to the east and Nazi Germany to the west, the Soviet Union was caught between two imperialistic nations who were seeking to satisfy their ambition for power and more land. To make matters worse, it was at this time that Stalin was attempting to consolidate his own power in the Soviet Union and in so doing he was eliminating competition by purging people he saw as a threat. In carrying out this plan, Stalin greatly weakened the political-military structure. A structure that would become necessary in order to combat a crisis of significant magnitude that was about to be thrust upon him. Seeing war on the horizon Stalin sought to stabilize his position in the world. He first sought the help of the British and French but as they searched for security in Europe, they gave away one concession after another to Hitler's Germany. Stalin knew that a partnership with the Western allies at this time was not in the best interest of the Soviet Union. To avoid a two front crisis, Stalin sought and obtained a non-aggression treaty with Germany in August 1939. Although Stalin did not trust Hitler, this gave the Soviet Union time to grow both economically and militarily. Stalin's plan called for the rest of the world to go to war and the Soviet Union to sit back and pick up the pieces as the other nations wore each other down. Stalin did not have to wait long before he put this plan into effect. Poland and Finland were his first targets.

In the Far East the Japanese threat was constantly on the minds of the leaders in Moscow. Soviet troops increased from "100,000 in 1931 to about 600,000 in 1939." [Ref. 21] During late 1938 and mid 1939 two major border clashes took place along the Manchuria-Soviet border. Soviet troops in this region fought valiantly and held their own against the elite Japanese Kwantung Army. This excellent showing by Soviet troops surely contributed to the Japanese leaders' perception that a major war with the Soviet Union at this time would not be wise. As an added assurance to what the Far East army had already accomplished, Stalin, in a period of less than two years, sought a second non-aggression treaty with a potential adversary in order to prevent a war and obtain security for the Soviet Union. A five year Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression treaty was signed in April 1941. For Stalin and the Soviet Union security and peace was now theirs, but it was to last just two short months before Hitler's German army would invade.

Between April 1941 and the early part of 1944 Soviet-Japanese relationship was cordial and politically proper. Each country had other major and more immediate concerns occupying their time. The Soviets were tied up with massive battles against Germany and Japan had its hands full fighting the U.S. in the Pacific.

As 1944 drew to an end the inevitable defeat of both Germany and Japan became apparent. Soviet-Japanese relations

started to decline and increasingly unfriendly overtures were expressed in the Soviet press. Japan tried to entice the Soviets into better relations by offering concessions in Manchuria and the Far East.

A month after the Yalta conference, Japanese intelligence received word of Stalin's promise of entering into war against Japan. Japanese politicians believed that this promise of a declaration of war was only a political gesture for the benefit of Soviet's Western allies. However, the Japanese military held this as a real threat but doubted the three month time limit. It is during this same time frame that Japanese intelligence first reported Soviet troop movement to the Far East.

On April 5, 1945 the Soviet Union declared the Neutrality Pact with Japan void. Japanese political leaders still believed that war with the Soviet Union was a long time off because, technically according to its terms, the treaty was still in effect until one year after the announcement of its termination. However, Japanese political leaders attempted serious overtures toward the Soviet Union in an effort to improve relations because of the following three considerations: Japan did not want war with the Soviet Union. Japan wanted to increase and cultivate Soviet friendship. Japan desired to use the Soviet Union as a possible mediator to end the war. [Ref. 22]

The following is a summary of what the Japanese believed was the Soviet's capability for war in the Far East during the early part of 1945:

1. The Soviet Union could enter the war as early as the summer of 1945, but more likely it would be in autumn.
2. The Soviets needed to transfer to the Far East 40 additional divisions before it would be ready to attack.
 - a. Because the Japanese first became aware of Soviet troop movement in February it was felt that the Soviet build up would not be completed until June or July.
 - b. Assuming that the Soviets would need an additional two months after the troops arrival to complete the necessary offensive preparations, it was believed that the earliest the Soviets would be ready would be August or September.

2. Intentions

In December of 1943 after Stalin returned from the Teheran conference, he informed his military leaders that within three to four months after Germany's defeat they would participate in a war against Japan. In this same month the first shipments of ammunition and supplies to be used in an offensive operation against Kwantung Army were shipped to the Far East.

At Yalta, Stalin pressured the West into accepting his demands for the assurance of the Soviet Union's entry into war with Japan.

April 27th, three weeks after the denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, Soviet General Headquarters (GHQ) were told to proceed with plans for war with Japan. Two months later the Far East campaign attack plan was approved.

At the Potsdam conference Stalin informed the allies that the Japanese on two separate occasions have approached the Soviet government about seeking peace with the allies. On both occasions Stalin rejected the idea as being too vague.

On 7 August Soviet GHQ signed and sent the directive to the Far Eastern Command, to commence military operations against Japan on August 9th. [Ref. 23]

3. Timing

From early July to early August the U.S. intercepted several messages between Japanese Foreign Minister Togo and Japanese Ambassador Sato in Moscow, discussing the possible use of the Soviet Union as a mediator to end the war. The Japanese, knowing that their eventual defeat was inevitable, saw the only stumbling block that prevented the termination of the war as the Allied position toward unconditional surrender.

On 26 July the Potsdam Declaration, calling for Japanese unconditional surrender was delivered by message to Tokyo. Two days later Japan answered these demands by saying they were "absurd and unworthy of consideration." [Ref. 24]

On August 6th, a company-sized border incident took place. Japanese subordinate armies viewed this incident as just another in a long series of minor incursions, signifying little. However, several of Kwantung Army staff officers saw this as a precursor to war and predicted hostilities were close at hand. On this same day the first atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima.

As late as the evening of the 7th of August, Togo sent a message to Sato asking to seek a clarification of the Soviet attitude towards Japan and their willingness to act as a mediator on Japan's behalf.

August 8th, with the Soviet invasion less than a day away, but still unknown to Japan, the Kwantung Army's Commander in Chief, General Yamada, ignored his staff's warnings and went on a planned vacation, leaving his headquarters.

That same day, 1700 Moscow time, 2200 Manchurian time, 2300 Tokyo time, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov met with the Japanese Ambassador and informed him that "the Soviet government declares that from tomorrow, that is 9 August, the Soviet Union will consider herself in a state of war against Japan." [Ref. 25] Two hours and ten minutes later Soviet Troops crossed the Manchurian border in force.

When the attack occurred on the 9th of August the timing was perfect. As mentioned in the strategic surprise section, several reasons made the time of attack so advantageous to the Soviets, but as an operational surprise the major

reason was the fact that the Japanese felt the Soviets would not attack before the end of the rainy season, which was still a few weeks away.

4. Place

In the Manchurian campaign the surprise attack came in a well timed three front assault. The Transbaikal front, in the west, the First Far Eastern front, in the east, and the Second Far Eastern front in the north.

Secrecy was a key element. The Soviets' success in achieving surprise in Manchuria was simply their ability at all levels to keep secret the impending attack, the size of the troops involved, and the direction from which a possible attack would come.

To enhance secrecy no one but a few high ranking Soviet officers knew the exact date and time the operation was to start. Most important orders were issued and transmitted in person by word of mouth. Additionally, senior commanders who were brought in from the German front were given fictitious names and ranks to protect their identity. So detailed were the plans that the following tale shows to what extent the Soviet went to ensure secrecy:

"At one staff meeting Marshal Meretskov, posing as Colonel-General Maximov, was asked by another officer if he had heard that Marshal Meretskov had arrived in the Far East. Playing his role to the hilt, Meretskov not only said he had not heard the rumor, but replied he had never seen the Marshal." [Ref. 26]

Together with secrecy the concealment and camouflaging of the vast amounts of troops and equipment was a major contributing factor to the accomplishment of surprise.

To increase the odds of success the Soviets planned and positioned troops whose previous war time experience against Germany in the West were now being pitted against similar conditions against Japanese in the Far East. As an example, those troops that saw action in mountain terrain in Europe were now employed on the Transbaikal front where the attack plan called for these troops to cross the Great Khingan mountain range. In addition to the special troop placement, the Soviet used the natural terrain and landscape of Manchuria as an aid to achieve surprise. The Soviet's ability to get tanks and tracked vehicles over and through the mountain passes was but one example of the Soviets attacking from places that the Japanese believed were either impassable or impossible to attack from.

To minimize the Japanese from gathering meaningful intelligence information on this pending Soviet attack many precautions were taken. Even though there were several border incidents the Soviets made a concerted effort to try to maintain the appearance of normalcy along the border area. To ensure that troops did not give away their positions all troop radio sets were placed on receive mode only. Soviet intelligence collection operations were carried out to the maximum extent possible but were limited so as to not to alarm the Japanese about Soviet intentions. [Ref. 27]

5. Strength

The Soviet forces in the Far East were under the command of Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky. These forces were positioned on three fronts. The western, Transbaikal Front, under the command of Marshal Malinovsky consisted of the 17th, 36th and 39th Soviet Armies and the 6th Guard's Tank Army. These units made-up 42% of the Soviet troops and equipment used during this campaign. (see Table 41 for summary of Soviet and Japanese strengths) In the east, the Soviets' 1st Far Eastern Front under the command of Marshal Meretskoy consisted of the 1st, 5th and 35th Soviet Armies. These units made up one-third of the Soviet Far East forces. In the north, the 2nd Far Eastern Front was led by General Purkayer who commanded the 2nd and 15th Soviet Armies consisting of one-fourth of the Soviet assets.

The Japanese forces were under the command of General Ushiroku. These forces consisted of the Japanese's 44th Army in the west, the 37th Army in the east, and the 4th Army in the north. Additionally, the Japanese had local forces from Manchoukus, Inner Mongolia and the province of Suiyuan fighting on their side. These additional forces increased Japanese troop count but did very little to increase Japanese's strength. [Ref. 28]

6. Style

The Soviet military showed themselves to be very innovative during the Manchurian campaign. They used the

TABLE 41

SOVIET AND JAPANESE STRENGTHS. AUG 1945

ITEM	SOVIET	JAPANESE	RATIO	NOTE
1. MEN	1,500,000	1,200,000	1.3 to 1	1,2,3,4
2. GUNS & MORTARS	26,000	5,400	4.8 to 1	-
3. TANKS & SELF PROPELLED GUNS	5,500	1,200	4.6 to 1	-
4. AIRCRAFT	3,900	1,800	2.2 to 1	5
5. NAVAL UNITS:				6
a. SHIPS	600	-	-	
b. A/C	1,500	-	-	

*** NOTES ***

1. Sources have disagreed on the value of Soviet strength, their numbers range from 1,059,000 to 1,577,725. The numbers listed above represent the most widely agreed upon figures. [Ref. 29]
2. Numbers include combat and support troops.
3. Japanese numbers include Manchurian troops.
4. Troops ratios went as high as 2 to 1 but, the key was that the Soviets were able to achieve 8 to 1 ratios by concentration at the point of attack.
5. Many Japanese aircraft (85%), were not battleworthy.
6. Little or no Japanese naval resistance.

concept of employing tanks in the first echelon as a spearhead attack. This tactic reverses the normal textbook approach to this battle front. By using this method the Soviets were able to overwhelm the Japanese troops who have never experienced this type of warfare before. The second bonus received from this tactic was that the Soviets were able to maintain great speed and depth into Japanese defenses. In fact the Soviet 6th Tank Guard army was able to average 60km per day and on some days as high as 90km. This feat takes on added dimension because this operation had to be done by crossing a formidable obstacle in the shape of the Great Khingan mountains. Once again Soviet skill and persistence overcame a major difficulty, and the tactical gains achieved by this accomplishment were significant. The Japanese placed little emphasis in this area because they felt it was a mountain range impassable to heavy equipment, so they had relatively few men to defend against attack and hence were totally surprised and quickly defeated by the Soviets.

Another area where the Soviets were innovative was their first time use of the border guards to conduct the initial phase of the war. These guards, because of their knowledge of the countryside, were able to lead and direct attacking combat troops with extreme accuracy. Because of the speed in which the Soviet troops advanced these guards took on the added responsibility of mopping up operations behind the rapidly advancing lines of attack. This effort

by the guards left the combat troops free to concentrate on and continuing to forge ahead. [Ref. 30]

As was mentioned in other sections the factor of time is extremely important to the achievement of surprise. Its use in tactical engagement is at least as critical and may be more important than for strategic surprise.

The last major concept the Soviets used to achieve surprise and success, was their deception to spread out their troops over the 5000km of the Manchuria-Soviet border. By doing this the Japanese had to spread out its defenses to meet the challenge. Because of tactical surprise the Soviets were able to concentrate their forces at the point of attack and along an axis of their choosing, thereby increasing significantly their strength ratios. By the use of surprise and deception the Soviets were able to achieve a surprise attack and reaped many benefits from the effects it caused. In fact they attacked simultaneously on all three fronts within an hour of each other, causing great confusion at Japanese HQs.

Once the attack occurred the speed of the Soviet advance was so great that the Japanese were unable to mount an effective counteroffensive. There were times that Japanese HQ was unable to adequately give orders to control its own troops. This became quite evident at the end of the war when Japan had officially surrendered but the Kwantung troops did not get the word and continued to fight on for several days longer.

7. Summary: Manchurian Campaign

Surprise on a grand scale, is difficult to accomplish. But if one can play upon the already preconceived ideas of a potential enemy, as the Soviets were able to do with the Japanese, surprise can be successfully achieved.

The major weakness that allowed Japan to be surprised on the Strategic level was not her inadequate warning but the persistence of Japanese leaders in clinging to the belief that the Soviets might help them end the war in a honorable manner. It was this belief and desire that Richard Heuer would say caused Japan to be a victim of her own preconceptions. In his article, "Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counterdeception" he said:

"... patterns of expectation become so deeply embedded that they continue to influence perceptions even when we are alerted to and try to take account of the existence of data that do not fit our preconception."
[Ref. 31]

Additionally, the data from Whaley's study shows that when preconceptions were exploited surprise was achieved 96% of the time (see Table 1).

The Potsdam Declaration, USAF bombing Japanese cities, the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the persistent hanging on to the cultural bias of ending the war with honor, the ever increasing threat of a U.S. invasion of the Japanese home islands, these dilemmas and more are what the Japanese had to deal with during the end of July and early August. The Japanese had fought a hard war for four years, her

military was exhausted, communication and logistic chaotic, supplies low and her people close to starving. The Soviet picture was not much better for she too had gone through much suffering and devastation. The major difference that had to be a factor, was that the Soviets drew strength from their victories where the Japanese at war's end knew nothing but defeats. As can be seen, the Japanese were overwhelmed with too much, too fast to be sensitive to the indicators of a Soviet surprise attack. This is a problem that will be seen again.

B. CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CAMPAIGN

1. Background; Czechoslovakian Campaign

After World War II Czechoslovakia became a political battleground between the camps of democracy and communism. The Communists in 1946 in a public election were able to succeed to power and become the largest party in Czechoslovakia. However, at this time they still did not have enough for a ruling majority. In 1948 a Communist coup overthrew President Benes, and quickly aligned itself with the Soviet Union and Moscow's policies.

Czechoslovakia was both an original member of the United Nations (1945) and the Warsaw Pact (1955). In 1957 President Antonin Zapotocky was succeeded by Antonin Novotny. In the next several years Czechoslovakia under Novotny's rule would slowly fall into disfavor with Soviet leadership. In December 1967 the Soviet Union General Secretary,

Leonid Brezhnev, flew to Prague to meet with Novotny. It was during this visit that it must have been decided that Novotny could not longer function as the Soviets' man in Czechoslovakia. In January 1968 Novotny was replaced by Alexander Dubcek. By Soviet standards Dubcek was very young. He was only forty-six, but he had been a Communist all of his life. He was well received by both his fellow countrymen and party members. Additionally, his entire political background showed loyalty and support for the Soviet Union. It was therefore not surprising that he met and fulfilled the Soviet need for a new leader who could both satisfy the Czechoslovakian people's quest for national identification and yet keep the country firmly within the Soviets' sphere of influence. This hope was short-lived, for revisionists had already infected the country to such an extensive degree that even Dubcek got caught up in its fever. Even though Dubcek continuously assured Moscow of his allegiance and promised that he would not let things get out of control, by February there were indications that the Soviet Union might move against Czechoslovakia with its military. All during the month of April the major issue expressed toward the Czechs in Soviet writings and official statements showed an increased concern that the Czechs were being corrupted by the West by allowing too many ties to be formed with capitalist countries. Additionally, the Soviets feared that the Czechs were upsetting the balance between the two ideological philosophies. [Ref. 32]

On 9 May Warsaw Pact military exercises began in southern Poland. In June these exercises ended, only to be quickly replaced with a group of new exercises involving Poland, GDR, and this time included Czechoslovakia. It was during Czechoslovakia's participation that 16,000 Soviet troops entered into Czechoslovakia and were able to familiarize themselves with local conditions and had what would turn out to be a dress rehearsal for invasion. Once again these exercises were terminated (11 July) but Soviet troops did not stand down and maneuvers continued. During this period there appeared to be some ray of hope that a peaceful solution to the difficulty could be agreed upon. A third major exercise was announced and began on July 25. On the 27th the famous "Two Thousand Words" Manifesto was released and printed in the Prague newspapers. This act of boldness was likened to a fan being applied to the burning embers of the revisionist's fire. A situation that needed a solution before it got out of control. It became evident to Soviet leaders that more and drastic action would be needed. Therefore in conjunction with the scheduled exercise the Soviets continued to increase the deployment of Soviet troops close to the Czech borders. These "maneuvers" fooled no one of their true intentions but they did serve as a transparent cover for keeping Soviet troops in place. To avoid the outbreak of hostility the leaders of both countries agreed to meet and discuss their differences. Two meetings took

place, the first at Cierna from 29 July to 1 August and the second at Bratislava on 4 August. Out of these negotiations came promises and declarations to restore communist ideals to Czechoslovakia in a peaceful but direct manner. Although tension remained high, for the moment a crisis seemed avoided. After the Bratislava meeting Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny, high Soviet leaders, were reported to have gone off on vacations giving support to the hope of the relaxing of tension. However, nothing could be further from the truth, for "Soviet troops earmarked for the invasion were ordered on general alert on 11 August and remained in that posture until the final go-ahead on the 20." [Ref. 33]

2. Intentions

"All Soviet decisionmakers would have agreed that Czechoslovakia should not be allowed to become a "second Yugoslavai" or a "second Rumania" Brezhnev told the former Czechoslovakian Ambassador Pavlovsky at an earlier stage of the crisis that Czechoslovakia was not Rumania, or Yugoslavia and that they would not let Czechoslovakia go." [Ref. 34]

A factor that had to be considered by the Soviets as they viewed the Czech situation was the deterioration of their own world prestige. After the Bratislava agreement there were indications that this agreement was perceived not only by the Czechs but by other Communist countries "as a sign of Soviet weakness and as a victory for the Czechs over the Soviets." [Ref. 35]

In June 1968 the Soviet leaders most likely viewed the possibility of intervention as one of its options, but were trying to use it only as a last resort. However, as time passed circumstances were quickly dictating the only choice left open to the Kremlin. The Soviets may have seen the threat as a realignment of Eastern Europe with a possible Czech - West German partnership or as an eroding of the ideological doctrine of Communism among socialist states. In any case the Soviet Union could not allow an independent course of action from one of its "allies". The Soviet Union regards Eastern Europe as vital to its national security and it was prepared to use force if necessary to preserve the hegemony there.

As late as the 17th of August the Soviet Politburo sent a warning letter to the Czechoslovakian government outlining Soviet concerns. This letter complained about the non-compliance by the Czech to the arrangements agreed upon at Cierna and Bratislava. It went on to say that the Czechoslovakian government was misinterpreting and abusing the freedoms allowed by these talks under the auspice of Czechoslovakian nationalism. The letter implied that in the Soviets' eyes things were getting out of hand and something needed to be done and done quickly before it became irreversible. The Soviets suggested it would be better if the Czech government were the one to accomplish this. However, if the unusable government of Dubcek could not be responsive

to Soviet wishes, then it was Soviet responsibility to see that the Czech government was changed and the situation rectified.

3. Timing

A factor that must be looked at when considering the timing of the Soviet invasion is the changing and scheduling of Czechoslovakian governmental meetings. The date of the Congress of the Slovak Party was shifted from October to August 26. Soviet leadership saw this revision of date as an attempt by the Czech reformers to legally seize control of Czechoslovakia. Additionally, the announcement that Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant would visit Prague on August 23 must have forced the Soviet leaders to carefully consider the timing of their intervention. As Pravda put it, "An atmosphere that was quite unacceptable for the socialist countries had been created. Under such circumstances it was necessary to act, and to act purposefully and decisively without losing time." [Ref. 36]

As viable options began to be eliminated and invasion loomed as the necessary course of action, the Soviet Union had to assess what risks would be involved. It now appears that militarily they felt the risk was low based on the fact that Dubcek was unwilling to put up a fight and the "United States-- caught up in the Vietnam war, racial disturbances, and presidential politics -- was ... unwilling to do anything on behalf of Czechoslovakia. This position was implied in

the public statements of Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1968 and by President Johnson's strong interest in the early start of SALT negotiations." [Ref. 37] The Soviet invasion actually came on the eve of the planned announcement of the forthcoming US-USSR Summit meeting between President Johnson and the Soviet leader Kosygin in Leningrad and the start of SALT negotiations.

Even though the Soviets tried to hide their troop build-up among the cover of "maneuvers" it was accurately detected by Western intelligence services. By early August the West had a good idea of the routes a possible Soviet invasion would take. There were some intelligence officials who correctly estimated that an invasion would occur but they erred on the exact date. Most Western analyst guessed that the invasion would happen early in September. Therefore, NATO commands did not respond to these signals nor did they go on any type of increased alert status.

As their Soviet counterparts did after the agreements of Bratislava, many of the Western leaders went on summer vacations with the strong belief that the Czech crisis was under control. On the 17th of August KGB agents were sent to Prague to help arrange a coup to overthrow Dubcek. On 18-19 August Brezhnev notified Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria of Soviet intentions to invade Czechoslovakia.

At 2230 on August 20th Soviet airborne troops took control of the Prague airport. A half hour later Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground troops crossed the Czechoslovakian border.

On the morning of the 21st of August at 0115 the Soviets conducted large scale jamming of Czechoslovakia, which initially was interpreted by the West as just part of the scheduled Soviet exercise. Not until 0150 over Radio Prague was the invasion announced to the world.

4. Place

The main Soviet attack force consisted of 500 tanks that traveled from the East German border to Prague, a distance of sixty miles, in just over three hours. The other two axes of attack crossed into Czechoslovakia directly from Hungary and the Soviet Union.

The takeover of Czech airfield was considered by the Soviets as vital to their success. It was during operations to achieve this objective that tactical deception and surprise was achieved. "The key airfield was the Ruzyne international airport at Prague. At 2230 on the 20th (of August) an unscheduled Russian Aeroflot passenger plane requested landing clearance, which the Prague control tower promptly granted. An all-male "tourist" party disembarked, visited the lavatory, and emerged as uniformed troops to seize the airport tower." [Ref. 38]

5. Strength

For Soviet initial invasion force summary see Table 42. The Czechoslovakian Army had 14 divisions consisting of approximately 75,000 troops. These troops were positioned facing westerly so as to protect the Warsaw Pact from any

TABLE 42

SOVIET INITIAL INVASION FORCE (CZECHOSLOVAKIA)
[Ref. 39]

NATIONALITY	NO. DIVISIONS	NO. TROOPS
Soviet	16	150,000
Polish	3	15,000
Bulgarian	1	5,000
East German	2	4,000
Hungarian	2	1,000
TOTALS:	24	175,000

** NOTE ***

(1) Additional troops about equal in number remained stationed at the border ready to respond if any serious military resistance was to occur.

possible NATO attack across Czechoslovakia's western border. When the Soviet invasion came the Czech troops were "in position" but in the wrong location to be of any assistance to the Czech government even if it wanted to use its army.

6. Style

The Soviet military tried to minimize hostile resistance through well-coordinated efforts both inside and from outside their target country. Sabotage, deception, ruse, political coups are but a few examples of ways the Soviets tried to weaken and deceive an opponent in order to enhance their own chances of a quick and successful operation. The following section is a summary of Soviet attempts to conduct these types of activities prior to and during the Czech invasion. "Three days before the actual invasion, the Soviet army and KGB operatives apparently received an order to prepare final details of the action. On that day an airplane carrying special KGB units and the Czechoslovakia STB collaborators reportedly landed at the Prague airport to prepare for the invasion." [Ref. 40]

"Although military resistance was not expected, the Soviet General Staff was apparently ordered to take necessary precautions to avoid conflict with Czechoslovakia Army units. Reportedly, during the summer the Warsaw Pact Command had lowered the Czechoslovakia fuel and ammunition stocks by transferring those supplies to East Germany for more "exercise". On August 19, the Warsaw Pact Command succeeded in securing the consent of the Czechoslovakia Ministry of Defense for an unexpected military exercise of of the Czechoslovakia Army with the participation of Warsaw Pact observers. The exercises were to take place on August 21 - the second day of intervention. In reality, this was probably a maneuver to concentrate the Czechoslovak military forces in the western part of Czechoslovakia in

order to minimize their opportunity to make contact with the invading troops, as well as to divert the attention of the Czechoslovak General Staff from the intervention." [Ref. 41]

On 20 August, the Czechoslovak Presidium met to discuss two major items. The first was the progress of the upcoming Party Congress and the second was a discussion on what direction the Czechoslovakia Community Party should take in the future. Due to a misinterpretation of the exact time of the Soviet invasion and the unsuccessful attempt of the antireformists to reverse the planned agenda items at this meeting, the Soviet invasion began without a formal request for assistance. The hope of the antireformists was to bring up the issue of the future of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia first so as to rally the Presidium behind their cause and hopefully to successfully take over the government by a peaceful coup. If they were successful in this attempt they would then request the Presidium to pass a resolution asking for Soviet assistance. All this was anticipated to happen prior to Warsaw Pact troops crossing the Czech border. Dubcek did not stand for a proposed change to the agenda and therefore the antireformists did not execute their coup and Soviet troops entered into Czechoslovakia without being formally asked.

7. Summary; Czechoslovakian Campaign

The Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia was shaped by many factors. Surely national security was a consideration, as must have been this attempt for nationalism

by a Eastern European country that was inside the Soviet sphere of influence. During the period leading up to the invasion the messages received from the United States professed their noninvolvement must have had an influence to choose invasion. It also appeared that because of the many constraints placed on the members of the Politburo that these men had to compromise on the available options in order to act decisively and quickly.

National preoccupations and preconceptions pre-disposed Western governments to avoid a close look at the Czech crisis and the impending threat as it developed. The US was particularly guilty. Warning signals were glossed over by high officials as they seemed to be near-sighted and only concerned with two issues: the increased escalation of the Vietnam war and the hope of a successful US-Soviet arms control negotiation. Although, once the Soviets had decided to invade, if the United States wanted to act there would have been little real responses that they could have taken that would have changed the situation. However, by their lack of timely action of any kind the U.S. did very little to deter Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led troops was entirely successful in terms of its immediate goals. It achieved both tactical and strategic surprise. Its speed of advance was so quick that it avoided both Czech military resistance and foreign intervention of any sort. "By 0200

on D-day itself, that is within two and half hour after the invasion, Radio Prague simultaneously announced the border crossings and forbade military resistance." [Ref. 42]

The Brezhnev Doctrine, which is used as a justification for Soviet intervention into socialist wavering countries is more than an expression of Soviet power, for with it comes the burden to monitor the numerous Communist countries and be ever ready to take military action if necessary. "An American President justified the US involvement in Southeast Asia by invoking the 'domino theory', and we all know how costly the implications of that theory have been for his country. But, for the Kremlin, the East European vassals really are "dominoes": if one totters, they all may collapse." [Ref. 43] The Czech campaign clearly demonstrates to what extent the Soviet leadership is willing to go to hold on to and defend Communism and Soviet gains. It will use force if necessary as a pretext to ensure security of its own borders.

C. AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN

1. Background; Afghanistan Campaign

It was in the late 1940's that Great Britain withdrew its claims in this part of the world and by so doing created a power vacuum waiting to be filled.

In 1952 Afghanistan actively sought and asked for US military aid. Washington avoided the issue by insisting that Afghanistan first join a regional security pact with her neighbors. When Afghanistan pressed the US for a commitment

on behalf of Afghanistan's defense the US response was less than favorable toward the Afgan government, for in the US view Afghanistan was too far removed and the US lacked the necessary presence to ensure her adequate protection - a problem that hinders more aggressive and positive action by the US. It was true then and remains true today.

Late in 1953 Mohammed Daud ascent to power and promises to "bring Afghanistan into the 20th centry". [Ref. 44] The Soviet Union stepping in to fill the void left the US and under the guise of its newly announced foreign policy to help the Third World nations of Africa and Asia, generously gave economic aid to Afghanistan.

In 1954 the US by giving aid to Pakistan alienated Afghanistan and anti-American riots break out in the capital city of Kabul. For the next several years Daud continued to play up to both sides and was successful in getting aid from both the US and USSR. In fact in 1959 President Eisenhower stopped for a brief visit to Kabul, followed shortly by a similar visit in 1960 by General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev.

Late in 1960 through early 1961 sporadic border war between Afghanistan and Pakistan erupted over an old disputed claim of the ownership of Pashtunistan, which was originally incorporated into Pakistan when the British left India many years prior but was never recognized by Afghanistan. The Western world backed Pakistan in its claim and the Soviet Union backed Afghanistan. Due to this issue diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and the West were officially severed.

In 1963 amidst economic troubles the Afghan King asked Daud to step down, and he was replaced by Muhammed Youseph. The next year a parliamentary monarchy was established. This change and the easing of domestic rule allowed liberal factions to begin to form. In January 1965 the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was organized with Muhammed Teraki as its leader.

From 1967 to 1970 because of the heavy involvement in Vietnam by the US and the commitment by the USSR to support North Vietnam, aid to Afghanistan from these two superpowers was drastically reduced.

Because of diverse points of views in 1967 the PDPA divided into two factional parties, the Khalq and the Parcham. The Khalq, (which means the People's Party) were made up of largely Pashtuns and comprised half of the population in Afghanistan, their leader was Teraki. The Parcham, (which means the Red Banner) were a mix of urban tribes and Kabul's intellectuals, their leader was Babrak Karmal. [Ref. 45]

Political stability in Afghanistan showed clear signs of giving way in 1973, when the Afghanistan military assisted Prince Mohammed Daud in the ouster of his cousin King Zahir Shah in a bloodless coup. From 1973 to 1976 Daud established stronger ties with regional nations and the Western World. Due to the growing concern over the policies of Daud in 1977 the Khalq and the Parcham forces reunited and formed a new PDPA.

Sensing the opportunity to exploit a revolutionary situation, the Soviets, who were suspicious of Daud's dealings with Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, began to assist Teraki's regime in what became the transformation of a neutral buffer state into a Soviet satellite. Although they promoted revolutionary change, the Soviets nevertheless urged Teraki to work toward reconciliation with the Muslim tribes that had begun to resist his Kabul regime. [Ref. 46]

On April 17, 1978 a Parcham party leader was assassinated. At his funeral two days later thousands of demonstrators broke into widespread rioting and it was necessary to call up the army to aid the police in controlling the crowds. One decision that eventually led to Daud's downfall was his middle-of-the-road policy of neither negotiating nor trying to defeat the rioting rebels. For, on April 28th he was killed in a political coup and the PADA took over the government of Afghanistan. Teraki became prime minister, Hafizullah Amin became deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and Karmal became another deputy prime minister.

By June an estimated seven hundred Soviet military advisors were working with the Afghanistan army. This was a marked increase from previous operations. A further shift toward Soviet influence occurred in December when a twenty-year treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. It was this treaty after the invasion that was used in part to justified Soviet actions,

for the treaty states: "to take appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries". [Ref. 47] Moscow repeatedly stated that it was only and legally fulfilling its treaty commitments.

In late 1978 and into early 1979 widespread revolts started to spring up throughout the countryside. The Afghan people were unhappy with the radical social and land reform measures they were forced to endure, but more importantly they were angry at the Khalq's anti-Islamic rhetoric.

By March the rebellion spread to such a degree that Afghanistan armed forces were being defeated by the rebels in several of the provinces. During this time the Soviets increased both their weapons and equipment shipments and also increased the numbers of "advisors" to Afghanistan. The Soviet military advisors during this period, because of the poor performance by the Afghan army, assumed direct combat and leadership roles in the Afghan army.

Due to the deteriorating situation, Teraki abdicated his position as prime minister on 27 March. He remained as secretary of state and defense minister. The prime minister went to Amin. It was believed that because of his close ties with the Afghan military he would be able to put down the revolt.

The alliance of convenience between the Khalq and the Parcham factions soon wore out its usefulness and the Khalqs, because of their stronger ties with the military, were

able to consolidate their power. To reduce the challenge from the Parchams most of their leaders were sent to embassy post abroad. Soviet-favored Parcham leader Karmal was sent to Czechoslovakia as an ambassador.

During the spring and summer high Soviet military and diplomatic officials visited Afghanistan in an effort to get a first hand look at the situation. Their purpose was to ease the pressure of the crisis that was building and to bring Amin's policies into closer alignment with those deemed appropriate by Moscow. In both instances no progress was made and in fact the crisis was getting out of control and Amin was becoming bothersome and threatening to the Soviet way and style. The reports brought back by these officials had to be very pessimistic and extremely worrisome to the Politburo.

In August two significant mutinies took place. The first was inside Kabul's strategic Bala Hissar Fortress. It took Soviet tanks and heavy armament to put it down. The second involved an Afghanistan armored brigade which killed all of its Soviet advisors and then joined the side of the rebels taking their Soviet made equipment with them. Desertions and mutinies raked the Afghanistan army and now the rebels in control of large sections of the countryside, the main source of new recruits were virtually cut off. [Ref. 48]

The Soviets responded to the deteriorating situation by sending still more military aid and advisors. Additionally,

the Soviets took over the Bagram Air Base, located eleven miles north of Kabul. This base was essentially Soviet controlled and limited to Soviet personnel only. The Soviets soon delivered to this base many Soviet aircraft and helicopters, their mission being fire support for Soviet ground troops. It was during this period that Soviet units inside Afghanistan began to operate and work independently of the Afghan army, its commanders and its troops.

When Teraki visited Moscow in September, Pravda reported on the 13th, that Teraki could be assured that he could rely on the "all-around" assistance of the Soviet Union, which included military support. Upon Teraki's return to Kabul, and with Soviet support, an anti-Amin coup was planned. Their objective was to establish a Khalq-Parcham coalition government led by Teraki and Karmal. The coup was a failure and instead of Amin, Teraki was removed from power and subsequently murdered by Amin's officers. [Ref. 49]

The Soviets probably started planning for a possible invasion many months prior to its actual execution. Looking at Soviet activity it appears that a practice airlift similar to the one that would be used against Kabul airport was held in August. Both Soviet troops and their equipment were flown from the Soviet Union to South Yemen and Ethiopia and back again.

In late November US intelligence detected the mobilization of Soviet troops in Turkmenistan and in other areas

along the Afghanistan borders. Local reserves were being called up. "By early December 1979, an estimated 3,500 to 4,000 Soviet military personnel were positioned in the Afghan army at every level of command." [Ref. 50] Western analysts noticed a military build-up on the Afghanistan border when some Soviet forces and tactical aircraft were shifted from the Iranian frontier. On 8-9 December airborne units of over 1,000 men, equipped with tanks and artillery, were airlifted to the Bagram airfield, where they were able to reinforce the Soviet units deployed there in September. This was the largest troop input into Afghanistan since September. Ten days later a large portion of this force was in place at the Salang Pass along the Kabul-Qondoos highway. This unit would hold that strategic point until 28 December when it would be linked with the lead elements of the invading Soviet forces.

2. Intention

Even in a country as backward and fanatically Islamic as Afghanistan, with hardly a semblance of a "working class" (as Marx would define it) and with only a small number of well educated elite, the Soviet Union was able to find enough "Communists" to form a government - even though their size and abilities turned out to be insufficient to hold control unaided by Soviet military aid and troops. "One may doubt the ideological commitment of these Afghan clients, but in Moscow's eyes that has long ago ceased to be a virtue as important as plain obedience." [Ref. 51]

Afghanistan under Teraki's rule pursued a brutal and savage struggle in an attempt to civilize and socialize this backward and Muslim country. These tribal and proud people were being forced to do things that they in their wildest dreams never even thought about no less ever experienced and now a new life style was being forced on to them by laws and regulations instituted by their government.

When Amin took over the leadership of Afghanistan there was hope that he would restore order and justice fairly to all of Afghanistan. This hope soon became an empty breeze with no substance, for Amin in many ways was more cruel and harsh than Teraki ever was and despite increasing Soviet military assistance he was unable to suppress the growing resistance of the Muslim rebels. Even with the aid of Soviet advisors in key command and control positions and Soviet pilots flying combat missions in jet fighters and helicopter gunships the strength of the rebel army grew. At the end of 1979 the rebels were successful in holding off Amin's offensive and controlled most of rural Afghanistan. The Afghan army was slowly deteriorating, due to mutinies, desertions, and poor leadership. Soviet advisors began to receive heavy casualties. In Soviet eyes, the situation was becoming desperate. They view Amin as a traitor and a loser. The Soviets feared that with increased pressure Amin might try to reestablish his ties with the West or even China.

At the end of 1979, the situation became critical. The Soviets had worked themselves into a corner with few options left open. They could not allow a victory by Islamic fanatics, nor would they tolerate the counterrevolutionary ideas supported by Amin's government.

The Soviet Union has become increasingly concerned with the ethnic groups that reside inside of the USSR. The Soviets dislike the trend in birth rate that shows Russian ethnic population almost at zero and Muslim and Islamic ethnic group rates increasingly significantly. The Soviets are experiencing difficulty in controlling a nation where there are so many varied and widely scattered ethnic groups. This fact is documented in their history and there is a genuine concern over the loyalty of their own people. For example, in World War II when Germany invaded the Soviet Union many Ukrainians came out and cheered and gave food and flowers to the invading German armies. In more recent years with the revolts and insurgencies of the fundamentalist in Iran and the Muslim in Afghanistan right on Soviet borders have done nothing to ease this fear and concern.

One does not know what ultimately caused the Soviets to decide to invade Afghanistan. Was it for national security? Was it to control a satellite nation? Or, was there some strategic goal? A possible answer is the Brezhnev Doctrine, which states that the USSR has the justification and the right to intervene on the behalf of any communist country

in order to preserve socialism. This doctrine is an ever popular rationale for Soviet actions.

3. Timing

When the Soviet leaders considered their options in the Afghanistan crisis they had to look at the possible American responses which might occur because of one of their choices. However, during the Soviet leadership's debate over what to do about Afghanistan, the US was preoccupied with its own crisis in Iran. This US involvement made the Soviet option to invade seem less risky than it otherwise might have been if the US was free to respond with any significant action.

"The crucial turning-point during the Afghan crisis was the seizure of the American hostages in early November. US failure to respond promptly with firm measures, including the use of military force, and the subsequent agonizing over the crisis were likely additional factors in the Politburo assessment of the cost and benefits of the invasion." [Ref. 52] To make the international picture even more difficult, in early December the Soviets promised Iran support if the US was to use force to rescue its hostages. By offering their support to Khomeini, the Iranian government need not be rushed or pressured to release their hostages. This strategy would keep the US distracted with Iran while freeing the Soviets to respond in Afghanistan.

The invasion of Afghanistan was scheduled for 25-26 December, during the Christmas holiday when most American and

Western leaders would either be on vacation or home for the holidays.

Troops actually started across the border at 0715 on the 27th of December.

4. Place

The Soviet invasion was spearheaded by four motorized rifle divisions which fanned out toward Herat, Kabul and the Pakistan border. Two divisions reached Kabul by way of the Termez and Kunduz roads, while the other two moved down the Kushka-Herat road. The Soviet troops continued to advance until they converged on Kandahar, in a classic pincer movement. A tank division followed the advance on the Herat road, acting as an operational reserve for the Soviet area commander.

On the night of 27 December elite Soviet airborne troops along with special assault detachments moved into Kabul from the airport, sabotaged the central telephone exchange and seized the radio and television station as well as the presidential palace and other major government buildings.

5. Strength

The Soviet army had an estimated 80,000-100,000 combat troops in position for the invasion of Afghanistan. By the first day of the new year 50,000 Soviet troops had crossed into Afghanistan. The Afghan army was for all practical purposes at the time of the invasion under the control of Soviet forces. The Afghan rebels who numbered about 30,000

were neither organized nor prepared to stop a Soviet attack even if they knew it was coming.

6. Style

Years of infiltration by friendly Afghan forces and Soviet agents plus last-minute seizure and sabotage carried out by KGB operatives and Soviet military advisers were able to neutralize many command and control nodes prior to or in the early stages of the invasion. One of these commando teams peacefully relieved the Afghanistan personnel manning the central communication system early on the morning of the invasion.

Even though the Soviet High command did not expect any effective fighting or resistance from the Afghanistan rebels they were none the less concerned because, "all the frictions of warfare are most strongly manifest when every move must be made swiftly, when specific buildings and even specific rooms must be found and seized in a surprise action tightly coordinated in time and space. Small teams of soldiers had to find their way, and quickly, in a strange city and at night. Only the most careful training and the most precise control can prevent accidental encounters with hostile elements, or even fractional fighting; only timing exactly coordinated can preserve surprise as the assault teams go for their separate targets all over the city."

[Ref. 53]

Soviets were able to disarm two Afghan armored divisions by convincing their leaders to turn in their ammunition and antitank weapons for inventory. Tank batteries were recalled for wintering, while tanks were scheduled for maintenance and sent to the repair depots.

The night before the invasion Soviet officials hosted a reception for Afghan dignitaries; when the party was over all the invited guests were arrested. At the same time Soviet military officers were giving a cocktail party for their Afghan counterparts. Toward the later part of evening the Soviet host, leaving plenty of liquor, slipped out of the party. Only with the sound of gunfire did the Afghan officers find out that they were locked in their own quarters.

An estimated two hundred flights of Soviet aircraft landed in Kabul on 24-26 December, deploying 10,000 Soviet airborne troops.

Prior to the invasion, Soviet officials tried to exploit factional struggle and prepare the way for a new pro-Soviet government. The Soviet aim was to institute a government which would ask for Soviet assistance, and thereby legitimize the Soviet invasion.

On 27 December a special Soviet assault unit and some Afghans attacked Amin and his supporters who refused to surrender. Amin died after a few hours of fierce battle. Later that day, Karmal declared himself the new leader of Afghanistan and stated that he had asked for Soviet assistance to stabilize his new government.

7. Summary; Afghanistan Campaign

Soviet-funded infrastructure greatly facilitated the 1979 invasion. As the Britain's prime minister, Mrs. Thatcher, put it, "Soviet tanks crossed Afghanistan on roads built with Soviet money, and their aircraft landed on airfields similarly financed." [Ref. 54]

The direct use of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and its use to overthrow an established government and the subsequent military occupation were without precedent outside Eastern Europe. Additionally, it appears that Soviet troops were directly involved with the elimination of Amin and his government.

In the Afghanistan campaign the Soviets were willing to abandon their traditionally low profile of limited, temporary and defensive combat involvement. For the first time the Soviet Union has taken on an open-ended commitment to pacify a Third World state using Soviet troops.

Due to Amin's defiant result to incorporate Soviet directions and ideas, the alienation of Afghan society by Amin's cruel regime, and the deterioration of the Afghanistan army made the choice of invasion almost inevitable. "Had it not invaded Afghanistan at the end of 1979, Moscow had every reason to expect the catastrophic collapse of the Marxist revolution in a country bordering on the USSR - a country in which Moscow had already invested enormous political and military capital - and the consequent loss of its own prestige." [Ref. 55]

The success of the Afghanistan invasion and coup may be a sign to Soviet leaders that in the future they will not stand by waiting for a coup to happen but rather they may be tempted to simulate one on their own. "Soviet military invasions are responses to what the Soviets believe are dangerous developments and/or attractive opportunities in countries located in geographic promixity to the USSR as well as in strategic areas of the Third World." [Ref. 56]

If the past is a looking glass of what might be done in the future then a lesson that might be learned from Afghanistan by the Soviet Union is that if one acts boldly in carrying out his action, his actions may bring about great rewards.

US intelligence knew about and were monitoring Soviet troop movement in and around Afghanistan. Several times prior to the invasion President Carter officially notified the Soviet Union of his concern over Soviet action around Afghanistan. However, due to the heavy involvement in the Iranian hostage crisis by the US, a credible American response could not be done.

Afghanistan was a victim of its location; it shares a common border with the Soviet Union. Additionally, Afghanistan's inherent political and economic weakness made it especially vulnerable to Soviet influence. The Soviet Union believes it was justified for its own security to obtain and become a dominant influence in Afghanistan.

Now that the Soviet Union has "control" of Afghanistan they can deploy their tactical aircraft in Afghan Air Bases and in a crisis can more effectively challenge the US naval task force present in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Additionally, due to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has improved its position both politically and militarily in regard to the possible adversaries, China and Pakistan.

Today the resistance still continues, and the Soviets show no signs of leaving. It is sad and unusual to see such injustice being carried out and yet there is little being done. The United States appears to be resigned to the fact that this is a Soviet internal problem and therefore makes little effort to provide assistance to the rebels. One would think that with all the Third World countries, revolutionary groups, and Muslim believers that there would have been a bigger and longer outcry of public opinion against this war than there has been. It appears that like the US the rest of the world has resigned itself to the fact that Afghanistan is too far away to do anything effective and therefore they let the Soviets handle its own problems by themselves.

D. CASE STUDY SUMMARY

See Table 43 on the next page.

TABLE 43
CASE STUDY SUMMARY

ELEMENTS OF SURPRISE	MANCHURIA	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	AFGHANISTAN
INTENTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - End war w/Japan - Seizure of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --- Sakhalin & Kurile Is. --- Jap. stockpiles - Aid Nat-Lib movements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Removal of "Unfriendly" Governments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Removal of "Unfriendly" Governments
TIME	DATE: 9 Aug 1945 HOUR: 0010 - rainy season - Japan asks "honorable end of war." - "War Declaration"	DATE: 20 Aug 1968 HOUR: 2300 -US escalation Vietnam -ask Pol solution -LBJ on vacation -election year -US-USSR Summit -planned start of SALT talks	DATE: 27 Dec 1979 HOUR: 0715 -US, Iran crisis -Iran & Pakistan quit CENTO. -Carter "will not use force." -Xmas/election yr -SALT II ratification
PLACE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 3- Front Attack (W. N. E) - Terrain, mts w/ tanks - Airborne: only used after Jap surrender 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -3-Front Attack (N. E. S) - Airborne: Prague 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -1-Front, 3-axis Attack. (W, S, E) - Airborne: Kabul
STRENGTH	1,577,725 SOV Trp RATIO: 1.8-2.5:1 - Air superiority - Jap. captured, 594,000	200-500,000 SOV Trp RATIO: 2:1 - Air superiority - SOV killed, 50-100	80-100,00 SOV Trp RATIO: 3:1 -Air superiority - SOV killed, 1500 2/80, 4-7000 5/80
STYLE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tanks as spear-head - border guards, let use initial attack - spread out troops - pre-stockpile of material 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -coup:Dubcek, caught - "fifth column" & SOV advisors -long" Warsaw Pact exercise on border -xfer fuel & ammo to E. Germ. -Czech/Sov ex. shed -NATO gauge, Sov forces in E. Germ - used civ aircraft 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -coup; Amin, "killed" - "fifth column" & Sov advisors -recall Ammo/anti-tank wep, inventory -winterize tank batt -party, dignitaries & officers -used civ aircraft -used cat "C" trp

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part IV is divided into three sections. The first chapter summarizes the main points and conclusions that were reached in the first three parts of this paper. Although the main theme of this paper was to look at surprise and especially the Soviet style of surprise, one would be remiss if in that process, ways to prevent or minimize the effects of surprise were not examined. Therefore, in chapter two this subject is discussed. This paper ends by making several suggestions and recommendations on how to institute the conclusions drawn from chapter one and the ideas presented in chapter two.

A. CONCLUSION

Warsaw Pact military strategy as shown by its literature and military exercises calls for large-scale penetration into enemy territory in order to secure strategic objectives; it continues to emphasize the element of SURPRISE and the necessity of rapid offensive operations.

(emphasis added) [Ref. 57]

The above quote was used by United States Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger in his preface to the 1985 publication of Soviet Military Power. This official government publication is an unclassified description of what is seen as the present threat imposed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. As has been shown by Soviet literature, by historical examination and reemphasized by the

statement above, surprise has been, is and will continue to be a key element in their strategy. Soviet military doctrine and philosophy emphasize the many advantages that surprise attacks can bring. Therefore it would be self-deceiving to not expect the Soviets to make every effort to achieve it in future operations.

For all the advantages surprise can give an attacking force, surprise still remains an underrated factor, and is often taken too lightly by political strategists in their planning. However, in military operations in the last twenty years the use of both surprise and deception techniques have been increasing sharply. The Historical Evaluation and Research Organization supports this observation, and states "The effects of surprise appear to be greater in more recent wars than they were in World War II". [Ref. 58] They go on to explain that in the use of their Quantified Judgment Model that the surprise effect computation of their formula should be multiplied by a factor of 1.33 for all wars after 1966 to account for this increased use and effect.

For the Soviets surprise is not an either/or situation but a question of degrees. Nor does surprise need to be perfect to succeed, that is, in order to benefit from the advantages of its effects. The Soviets view surprise as a combination of their victim's misperceptions, preconceptions and his gullibility plus their own skills of carrying out deception operations.

Several common themes on surprise which often appear in Soviet military literature can be summarized by the following four statements: (1) Surprise can be re-used and achieved at all levels of warfare. (2) Deception is a positive measure to use in order to enhance the success of surprise. (3) Surprise at the strategic level can drastically reduce the time, cost, and effort for the attainment of victory. (4) Surprise strategy and tactics used in the Manchurian campaign is seen as a model of how well the Soviet Union can use effective procedures in modern combined arms operation and supply logistics to support it.

Table 44 summarizes Soviets views of what surprise can accomplish and the advantages that could be attended if surprise was successful.

The Soviet Union is a society that believes that all things can be examined scientifically. They believe that there are "Laws of War", just as there are "Laws of Physics", and these laws govern the outcome of war. The Soviets believe that all wars follow these laws and if one knew them they could properly predict the outcome of any war before its start. Fortunately, for the West, the Soviets admit that at the present time they do not know all the laws. However, the Soviets think that they can get a better insight in these laws by studying historical battles. They believe the laws do not change and use the history of World War II as a laboratory in an attempt to capture these laws and reapply them under modern

TABLE 44

SUMMARY OF SOVIET VIEWS ON SURPRISE

I. FIVE ELEMENTS OF SURPRISE

1. Intention
2. Time
3. Place
4. Strength
5. Style

II. ADVANTAGES OF SURPRISE

1. Change the correlation of forces.
2. Lower one's enemy's combat capability.
3. Create panic and lost of enemy's morale.
4. Loss of control (enemy disorganized).
5. Difficulty to execute countermeasures.
6. Defeat enemy:
 - (a) quicker.
 - (b) with smaller forces.
 - (c) with lower losses.

III. FACTORS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SURPRISE

1. Secretly positioning of forces and equipment (Logistic).
2. Use of weather.
3. Secrecy of plans of operation.
4. Communication security.
5. Disinformation.
6. Camouflage and concealment.
- 7: Terrain (unexpected axis of attack).

8. Audacity and Speed of advance (firepower).
9. Exploit moral implication to enemy (shock).
10. Maintenance of normalcy (i.e. along border).
11. Maximum use of accurate intelligence collection efforts.
12. Use of night operations.
13. Creative organization of forces (tactics).
14. Introduction of new technology and/or weapons.
15. High level of troop readiness (training, equipment, morale).
16. Axis of advance (direction), unknown or several.
17. Demonstrations (deceptive maneuver).
18. Use of imitation (decoys, dummies).
19. Ability to anticipate the enemy's behavior.
20. Officer corps leadership skills and abilities.
21. Use of preconceptions of the enemy.
22. The low response time of the enemy.

conditions. As was shown in Part II, the Soviets remember the lessons of history more than the United States. This was pointed out by United States Secretary of State George Schultz in a speech he gave in April 1985, in which he was comparing Vietnam and Nicaragua and he asked "How many times must we learn the same lesson?" [Ref. 59]

The Soviets seem to learn their lessons well and are able to apply complimentary principles to pose a great threat to the West. In Table 18 it was shown that when the force ratio of a country increases so does the probability of their achieved success. Additionally, it was shown that when surprise is interjected into their equation the surprise was able to change the relationship and less forces were needed in order to achieve comparable success. The three case studies showed that the Soviets held an unquestionable superiority in strength as compared to their adversary and yet they employed detailed deceptive tactics in order to achieve surprise. When one couples the results of Table 18 with the implications of the case studies, one sees the Soviets not satisfied with marginal benefits and exploiting the advantages gained from both force superiority and surprise.

It can be shown from the data and cases that with a relatively small number of deceptive ruses one stands a high probability of a successful surprise attack even if they are detected and a warning is sounded. When the data is examined on the factor of warning a striking paradox is found. It was

often the case that the leaders of a country prior to the start of a war knew his aggressor's strategy and plans. Additionally he had relatively reliable intelligence information of the strength of the enemy troops and the probable place and time of their attack. There was warning and there was an opportunity to take measures to counter this surprise attack. However, in most cases nothing was done until after the attack had begun. The main reason to explain this non-action when one is in the jaws of danger is misperception and rationalization. These subjects will be covered in the next chapter.

To summarize the Soviets' style of surprise one can look at the five factors of surprise and see how the Soviets typically try to achieve them:

- | | |
|------------|--|
| Intentions | Misinformation through the use of propaganda, KGB, and the use of Western public opinions and place movements. Additionally the use of negotiations and treaties in order to hide their intentions or to slow down the advantages of the West and allow them to close the gap. |
| Time | (1) The data suggests the Soviets preferred and achieve their greatest success during the morning period, however, nighttime is often used.
(2) When it comes to days they prefer to attack on Thursday and Sunday and tend to do it during Holiday or rainy seasons. |
| Place | (1) The use of camouflage and deception techniques can cause doubt of main attack and therefore must protect along a wider area.
(2) The Soviets have a propensity to do the impossible when it comes to difficulty of terrain. The Impossible becomes the fuel for surprise. |

Strength	Strength is increased by concentrating forces at the point of attack and using Blitzkrieg type tactics. The Operational Maneuvering Group (OMG) concept fits well into this strategy.
Style	(1) The research efforts by the Soviets are impressive as they continue to develop new weapons and new methods of using these and other systems they already have. (2) "On maneuvers" is a favorite ruse to achieve mobilization.

Although these items listed above appear to be typical and preferred by the Soviets, it should be noted that any habit if it is known and used is not a surprise. These preferences must always be scrutinized to avoid the trap of being surprised by one's own preconceptions.

The incidents of the KAL 007, Major Nicholson, and the Soviet grenade instructor suggest that the Soviets are not like Americans and in fact are drastically different in their way of thinking. Yet the West continues to be surprised by Soviet behavior. When the West thinks the Soviets should do one thing they surprise us and do something else. Early April 1985, a large Soviet Naval task force was operating in the Sea of Japan and was headed south. This event is significant for two reasons: it was the first time the Soviets had assembled a carrier group and because both the Japanese and American analysts thought the task force would continue south and exercise in the Indian Ocean. Both were proven wrong when the group changed course to the east. The Soviets surprised the West because they used new methods in the use of a system they already possessed and in their behavior, but only because

the Western analysts allowed their perceptions to cloud their thinking. [Ref. 60]

To analysts the Soviet style is seen as being too rigid and inflexible and they are or would be vulnerable to Western forces because of their emphasis or innovation on the battlefield. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Soviets have shown with both the utilization of the OMG concept and an overwhelming commitment to the use of surprise attacks that they are also committed to flexibility.

V.Y. Savkin in his book The Basic Principles of Operational Art said: "If one has succeeded in deceiving the enemy once, then he will not allow himself to be deceived a second time by the same technique. Therefore, there is a continuous search for newer techniques and methods for achieving surprise".

[Ref. 61] It is paradoxical if one uses a technique one loses its value as a subsequent element of surprise yet if training and use does not occur one can not be sure how successful its employment will be.

The Soviet Union is a secretive state and one can expect to find continued efforts by the Soviets to develop new means and ways to deceive and conceal its true intention, whereby achieving new methods with which to surprise the West.

B. SURPRISE AVOIDANCE: THE PROBLEM

Surprise depends on a state of mind that must be artfully created. Surprise can be aided by the use of deception but to be successful these techniques must be rational and must

prey upon an intended victim's perceptions. For surprise in its simplest form is no more than the creation and support of a false reality that one's enemy tend to believe is true. Therefore, in order to avoid surprise one must discover where these falsehoods exist.

Surprise attacks are successful because they take advantage of behavioral factors. Some of these factors are: perceptions, attitudes, assumptions, cultural values, norms and bias, and the roles and the dynamics of group interaction. For surprise to be successful a would-be surpriser must be able to modify and control the above factors so that an intended victim's perception and fear of vulnerability to the pending attack is minimized. Roberta Wohlstetter in her studies of the Japanese attack in Pearl Harbor discovered that "the possibility of such surprise at any time lies in the conditions of human perception and stems from uncertainties so basic that they are not likely to be eliminated though they might be reduced". [Ref. 62]

Surprise occurs not for the lack of good intelligence information but due to the misperception of the available information. Simply stated misperception is a discrepancy between what one holds to be true and what is actually true in the real world. World leaders try to structure new information into already held theories and beliefs. Information which supports these theories is noticed and processed, and signals that do not fall to the side. When the amount of

information increases and especially when that information is ambiguous a leader has little alternative than to fall back on his own preconceptions and beliefs. As was discussed in a paradox in the last chapter, information in most cases was available to warrant an alert of possible attack but the information did not agree with the strategically held assumptions and therefore was either ignored or misinterpreted.

When one is looking at surprise avoidance it is difficult to say that the surpriser should be credited with achieving surprise or the victim blamed for failing to avoid it. However, this type of argument is never-ending and similar to asking if a cup is half full or half empty. The answer still leaves the basic problem for the potential victim: being able to detect from all the signals what is noise and what is warning, and being able to do it before the attack, not afterward.

Since surprise is a behavioral factor, to understand it and prevent it one must look at two areas. First, an understanding of the behavioral style of his enemy is essential. The Soviet style of surprise has been discussed earlier. But in the context of surprise avoidance, when there is any suspicion that an adversary might attack, one must do two calculations: First, figure out how, when and where this attack would occur and determine what would be the outcome; secondly, recalculate, changing the assumption that this adversary was able to achieve

a surprise attack. If the outcome changes in favor of the adversary when using surprise, then in all probability he will employ that tactic and it would be wise to take active measures beforehand to see that he is not successful. Additionally, when one is confronted with the possibility of a surprise attack the answers to the following three questions may provide the necessary inputs for a solution to help combat and minimize the effects caused by this type of attack. What goal does the enemy want to achieve? What risk is the enemy willing to undertake? How many surprises alter the cost-benefit ratio if one's enemy chooses to attack?

The second behavioral factor that needs to be understood is the behavioral style of one's own government, military, and self. The surest way to be a victim of surprise attack is to fail to anticipate war. There are three major errors that must be avoided. (1) The making of erroneous assessments, assumptions or expectations. (2) The failure of one's warning network. (3) Inadequate preparation. The key appears to be the prevention of the first error, because if it is prevented or reduced the other two may not occur. A problem to be overcome is the rationalization of what an enemy can and cannot do. For example, here are some commonly used rationalizations: Surely an enemy would not do what we ourselves can not do; Surely an enemy could not be doing what he is doing because there are more economical and more efficient ways of accomplishing the same goals; Surely an enemy would not conduct

his operations in the manner he is because that would only duplicate what he has already done; Surely an enemy would not do what he is doing because he could not be so evil.

The only factor that hinders surprise avoidance more than rationalization is the "military overconfidence deriving from the underestimation of the adversary's capability."

[Ref. 63] Only recently has the West considered the threat from the Soviet arms build-up more than a challenge of quality vice quantity. The Western view was that they may be behind in numbers but they more than make up for it in superior technical quality. This is no longer the case and the West needs to and has started to improve their armed forces and capabilities.

The Western world has a difficult task, for democratic countries disapprove of aggression and therefore are more cautious to act. They are always vulnerable to surprise attacks. In democracies the key figures are political leaders and there are very few who want to believe war is imminent or are willing to accept the consequences of ordering the necessary military measures before a war begins and hence in crises situations their search for peace hinders them from preventing a surprise attack.

C. SURPRISE AVOIDANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS

"What is called "foreknowledge" cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from Gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation."

Sun Tzu

5th Century B.C.

The history of mankind is full of confrontations in which surprise was a dominant factor. However, the possibility of being taken by surprise can be reduced, and it is certainly possible to take steps that will moderate its effects if, in spite of everything, it does occur.

There is a great disparity between what the Western world thinks of as peace and the Soviets' concept. To the Soviets peace is only one of the many conditions found in international relationships whereby the socialist and the capitalist elements are in a struggle using all the means available to them short of war in order to accomplish their strategic goals.

The Pentagon released in March 1985 a publication which confirmed this struggle by stating: "Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union are now the principal threats to democracy in Central America". [Ref. 64]

President Reagan echoed the same message to months later when he accused the Soviets of trying to "spread their dominance by force". [Ref. 65]

The Soviets are geared for a short and violent war in Europe. The Soviets believe the more time NATO has to prepare for this war the chances for their success diminishes. The implication of this plus the transformation of Warsaw Pact troops into a highly mobile fighting force gives credence to surprise being a basic ingredient of Soviet strategy in Europe.

Today many Western analysts believe that an attack by the Soviets in Germany is extremely unlikely if not virtually inconceivable. However, no one seems to have told this to the Soviets for they continue to build, growing stronger and more capable of carrying out what the West would want to believe will never happen. The Soviets are scientific and cautious by nature and if they think that what equipment and men they have available is not enough to ensure a win then they will wait and take the necessary time and steps until the needed material is available. One can only hope that these assumptions, beliefs and hopes of the Western analysts do not act as filters to mask the critical intelligence information needed to truly interpret Soviet behavior and intentions. All too often the preconceptions of these men doing the watching filter out the threat signals needed to prevent this. In other words we believe what we want to believe.

If we accept the fact that warning signals at best are going to be ambiguous then one must be capable of reacting

repeatedly to these false alarms without going to war. As was mentioned earlier, in democratic countries there is a reluctance to do this. To say rapid, decisive and correct decisions would be made even given sufficient warning in a crisis is further compounded by the entangled systems of alliances and government involved in NATO and the Western world. Hopefully, when peace is really on the line the delays we see in peacetime will be avoided. Unfortunately, the historical record to date leaves one doubtful and concerned.

"We cannot count on strategic warning. We might get it and we might be able to take useful preparatory action that would be impossible without it ... However, since we cannot rely on strategic warning, our defenses ... must be designed to function without it." [Ref. 66]

Counting on strategic warning for reasons stated earlier is inherently dangerous. We must rely upon something other than expecting to receive ample warning or to correctly interpret a shift in Soviet intentions. We cannot depend upon our leaders, who are constrained by many factors, to take the proper precautionary measures in time. They just will not have the luxury of abundant time in order to act. The Western and democratic way is becoming its own worst enemy, by continuing to accept the full political implications of basing their strategy as well as their security and maybe their very existence on the idea of receiving the timely warning.

The West may fear Soviet capabilities but apparently they do not fear their intentions. This may be in part due to the belief that war is such a remote possibility. Yet this wishful thinking of war may also be the product of the illusion that the West is immune to surprise. Surprise on a large scale appears to be no longer frightful to the West. P. H. Vigor in his book Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory may provide an answer to why this menacing threat goes almost totally ignored. He calls it his dead volcano theory. Vigor explains: "Danger is that which moves ... once it has remained motionless for a sufficient period, even the most suspicious human will cease to worry about it. It will have become not merely part of the landscape, but a normal part of the landscape. And normalcy is not dangerous. Normalcy is the familiar, the ordinary, the safe." [Ref. 67]

It would be much wiser to base one's strategy on what is the enemy's capability to conduct an attack rather than base it upon what the enemy professes are his intentions, especially if the potential enemy is the Soviet Union. A review of the Soviet record of what they agreed to and said they would do against what they actually did, would find a wide disparity between the two. Intentions are relatively easy for a country to change and it would only require a short period of time to do so. It would be prudent not to defend against these suspect intentions, but defend against an attack that otherwise may not be expected. "There is no way

to eliminate misperceptions. The world is too complex and the available information too ambiguous for that." [Ref. 68]

"The more alert we are to deception, the more likely we are to be deceived." [Ref. 69]

These two quotes appear to close the door on any options that surprise could be avoided. This author believes that surprise and its effects can be reduced if not eliminated and if surprise does occur it can be dealt with.

The following are recommendations of how to minimize the chances of being surprised:

(1) Know one's enemy, his style, his behavior and his doctrine, being extremely careful not to color one's view by mirror imaging.

(2) Reduce the influence and increase the flexibility of working within a group or organization. Intelligence organizations must allow and encourage skepticism, imagination and diverse interpretations for this will aid the vigilance for surprise. We must all be more open to evidence and ideas that are in variance with our preconceptions.

(3) Lower the threshold of warning and increase the tolerance of false alarms. Decisionmakers must encourage their supportive intelligence organizations to take the risk of false alarms. They should not be afraid, if the odds and warning indicates, to go up to wake the President at three o'clock in the morning and then have nothing happen.

The Congress and the press who can be unjustifiably critical must be educated and instructed to understand the reasons for these extra countermeasures, for it would be far better to pay the price of several false alerts than to suffer the consequences of a surprise attack.

(4) If there are false alerts and frequent mobilizations there will be a tendency after a while to relax one's attention and alertness. One must be conscious of the effects of cry-wolf syndrome and take creative and active measures to avoid it.

(5) Improve the quality and style of the collection of intelligence data. First remove the bias and misperceptions. This could be done in conjunction with item (2) above plus the use of pluralistic intelligence systems that analyze the same data, but more importantly present their separate views to the decision-maker. Second, Intelligence officers must get away from the monotonous presentation of only facts and figures and offering answers their leaders want to hear. They must be able to propose questions and scenarios to enhance the decision-makers' own thought process and to cover the full range of possible uncertainties. Thirdly, the political, military and intelligence communities must have a closer relationship to allow for easier and freer flow of information.

(6) The assumptions that form the National Strategic plans, strategy and doctrines must be constantly reviewed,

challenged and held suspect for changes and misinterpretations brought on by misinformation or misperceptions.

(7) Responses must fit the ambiguities of the information at hand and minimize the risk of error and inaction. We must be careful not to be nearsighted and pinned down in one area and forget the rest of the world or cause one to miss the proper warning signals. The United States has fallen victim to these failures several times in the past. During Pearl Harbor we were troubled with the war in Europe. During the Hungarian crisis in 1956 our attention was focused on the problems in the Suez Canal. In 1968 Vietnam took our attention away from eastern Europe and Czechoslovakia. When the Soviets were moving into Afghanistan the United States was attempting to get its hostages out of Iran.

In several of these incidents there may not have been much that the United States could have done but they might have been able to do more. A second theme in concert with this idea of being preoccupied elsewhere is the notion of saying something that maybe should have been left unsaid. For example, the Korean War might have been avoided if the United States Secretary of State did not state that Korea was outside the US's sphere of influence and protection only to have several months later President Truman reverse this position as hostilities increased. In the case of Hungary the United States hurt its credibility by saying too much and leaving the Hungarians nothing but empty promises. In

both cases of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the United States both formally and informally told the Soviets that these two countries belonged to their sphere of influence and they would not interfere militarily. To counter this problem, "History suggest that it is more effective to say very little - and even to make the Soviet leadership guess what the response will be - than to be inconsistent."

[Ref. 70]

(8) Decision-makers must be careful not to be victims of the belief that if only one received more information than the probability of preventing surprise would increase. As we have seen this rarely occurs and should not be relied on.

(9) The need for security should never override the need to have adequate communications between the decision-makers and the commander in the field. To hold back information for fear it would compromise the operation or the source is inexcusable especially with today's reliance on rapid communication and the need to know by the field commander.

(10) Surprise attacks are always possible, therefore one must be prepared to fight under those conditions. Training and exercises should be conducted that practice reacting to surprise attacks. There should be practice of converting warning signals into appropriate response actions. Through exercises and war games a feel for what may become a reality in the future can be obtained. During the 1920's and 30's

many Naval war games were played that involved scenarios involving the Japanese in the Pacific. When World War II occurred many of these same scenarios materialized and the strategy and lessons learned from these games became the battle plans and orders for actual combat operations. Even more recently scenarios and exercises have become the pre-planning and practice for operation in Grenada and the strategy of the Persian Gulf. These games and exercises are extremely valuable for they help prepare the means and ways to combat and avoid surprise attacks and to minimize its impact if successful.

(11) The Soviets are scientifically orientated and cautious people. They ensure that the odds are in their favor or they will wait until they are. They avoid risk with the Western powers if at all possible. If the West increased the number of options, both declaratory and official, that were available in a crisis situation this added risk would increase the Soviets uncertainty and therefore cause the Soviets to wait and rethink their actions.

(12) Because of the secretive nature of the Soviet Union a big challenge to the West is to learn to work and deal more precisely in an environment of uncertainty.

(13) If all else fails and in certain circumstances it would be wise to have a strategy to be able to conduct a pre-emptive attack as a precautionary measure to prevent surprise. The best response to surprise is surprise.

The above items are recommendations that can be done to reduce or eliminate surprise. What follows is an explanation of what can be done if in spite of all efforts one is still surprised by an attack. Surprise by itself can achieve nothing, it can only provide the advantageous conditions whereby great achievements can be made possible. If this advantageous condition is exploited to the maximum by the initiator, the results can be catastrophic to the victim. However, if the defender's strategy is well planned and practiced he may be able to shift these conditions to his advantage.

In order to do this the defender must be able to absorb the initiator's surprise attack and be able to blunt his momentum. To accomplish this task one must be supported by a well-established and organized defense-in-depth strategy and the trained troops to efficiently carry it out in an environment where great pressure and confusion will be high. The defenders must slow the advance of the attackers along the axis of his breakthrough. This can be done by the controlling of strategically key terrain, such as mountain passes and river crossings and the effective use of artillery and airpower. A major tactic to conduct once the above has been accomplished and at the earliest possible time is to counterattack and to go on the counteroffensive. As was mentioned earlier, the best surprise is a countersurprise. Because of the rigid timetables that a Soviet war plan

would be on, if one could drastically upset that schedule, their tightly centralized command structure could be overburdened to compensate. The initiative could well be shifted to the counterattacker at this point.

In closing two observations need to be made. First, if one looks at the four major actions of the last forty years that involved the Soviets and their successful use of surprise attacks, one sees a unique occurrence. The four cases were Manchuria in 1945, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979. The unique pattern that these cases produce are that they are almost on an eleven year cycle. The implication of this pattern is that in the 1990's the next Soviet strike will occur. If this pattern was more than a coincidence, a question that then would be necessary to ask is, where would this attack occur?

The second observation is a summary of what America and the Soviet Union are like. Alexis de Tocqueville made this summary over one hundred and fifty years ago yet it still holds true today.

"There are now two great nations in the world which starting from different points, seem to advancing toward the same goal: The Russians and the Anglo-Americans.

Both have grown in obscurity, and while the world's attention was occupied elsewhere, they have suddenly taken their place among the leading nations, making the world take note of their birth and of their greatness almost at the same instant.

All other peoples seems to have nearly reached their natural limits and to need nothing but to preserve them; but these two are growing. All the others have halted

or advanced only through great exertions; they alone march easily and quickly forward along a path whose end no eye can yet see.

The American fights against natural obstacles; the Russian is at grips with men. The former combats the wilderness and barbarism; the latter, civilization with all its arms. America's conquests are made with the plowshare, Russia's with the sword.

To attain their aims, the former relies on personal interest and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of individuals.

The latter in a sense concentrates the whole power of society in one man.

One has freedom as the principal means of action; the other has servitude.

Their point of departure is different and their paths diverse; nevertheless, each seems called by some secret design of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world." [Ref. 71]

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